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"CORRUPTLY": WHY CORRUPT STATE OF MIND IS
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR HOBBS ACT
EXTORTION UNDER COLOR. OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
Jeremy N. Gayed*
INTRODUCTION
Public officials of the thirteenth to late eighteenth century right-
fully collected statutory dues and customary fees from the public to
supplement the insufficient income paid by the Crown. Predictably,
the mixture of official authority with pecuniary self-interest often re-
sulted in abuse, with many officials taking greater fees than were right-
fully appropriate. To combat this widespread corruption, England
developed a body of law for the punishment of improper takings by
public officials. Because these officials lived in a context of poor over-
sight while concurrently possessing a right to independently collect
revenue, the distinction between corrupt extortion and innocent fee
collection was murky. To help navigate the fog, common law courts
developed a doctrine of corrupt state of mind: public officials were
only guilty of extortion or bribery when they took with an unlawful
purpose, that is, when they knew that they were not due the amount
they received.'
Public officials of the modern American variety exist in a context
strikingly similar to medieval England. Elected public officials have a
right to receive campaign contributions from businesses and individu-
als that have an interest in their official conduct. The right to collect
campaign funds is complicated; although politicians may accept con-
tributions from interested parties intending to influence their con-
duct, they may not accept bribes or extort. Oversight of campaign
finance is poor, and the murky lines between guilt and innocence
compose an intricate web of regulation that consists of internal ethical
guidelines, and extortion, bribery, and illegal gratuities statutes.
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004. My gratitude goes
to to Eric Tamashasky and Jason Stare for fruitful discussion and perspective and to
my wife Maija-Liisa, whose steadfast support upholds all my endeavors.
1 See infra notes 11-116 and accompanying text.
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Corruption by public officials is commonly prosecuted under the
Hobbs Act.2 The Hobbs Act, which adopts common law extortion,
does not have a corrupt state of mind element on its face. Courts
interpreting the Act have overlooked that extortion at common law
required a corrupt state of mind, and have failed to read such a
mental element into the statute.
Nevertheless, courts have increasingly recognized that using the
Hobbs Act as an ethics-in-government statute presents problems both
of breadth and of differentiation, and have tried to mitigate these
problems through the imposition of various judicial modifications.
These glosses, primarily the quid pro quo standard from McCormick v.
United States3 and Evans v. United States,4 serve as imperfect substitutes
for a corrupt state of mind.5 Furthermore, courts have in some in-
stances replaced the corrupt state of mind element on the face of the
bribery statute with a quid pro quo standard, thus leaving both well-
meaning politicians and victims of extortion susceptible to
prosecution.
Both formally and functionally, the soundest solution to these dif-
ficulties in applying the Hobbs Act is to rediscover the common law
corrupt state of mind requirement. Formally, reading a corrupt state
of mind into the Hobbs Act would comport with the general principle
of mens rea laid out in Morrisette v. United States.6 Functionally, by
instituting a corrupt state of mind requirement, the courts could es-
cape the overbreadth problem created by the Hobbs Act's facial
scope, the underbreadth problem created by the Supreme Court's in-
terpretational demand for a quid pro quo, and the problems of differ-
entiation that plague this insolubly murky area of law. Perhaps most
importantly, a corrupt state-of-mind requirement could save both in-
nocent politicians and well-intentioned victims of extortion from the
tribulation of federal prosecution.
2 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
3 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
4 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
5 See infia Part V.A. McCormick set out an explicit quid pro quo requirement that
is fundamentally underbroad. See McCornick, 500 U.S. at 271-74. Evans subsequently
replaced this standard with an implicit quid pro quo requirement that is fundamen-
tally overbroad. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 268-69. The ideal solution, both formally and
functionally, is to abandon quid pro quo as an element in favor of a corrupt state of
mind requirement.
6 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (holding that when Congress creates criminal statutes
that cover common law crimes, the "absence of contrary direction [regarding requi-




This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the common law
history of color-of-right extortion, focusing on the presence and defi-
nition of a corrupt state of mind in the crime. Part II introduces the
Hobbs Act and discusses the propriety of applying the common-law
corrupt state of mind requirement in light of the statute's history.
Part III continues this analysis in the context of the New York Penal
Code of 1865-the source of the color-of-right language in the Hobbs
Act. Part IV demonstrates the modern applicability of corrupt state of
mind through a case study of one modern federal case that "gets it
right ' 7 and another that gets it tragically wrong.8 Part V is a broader
survey of the Supreme Court and those circuits that have most rele-
vantly addressed the issue. Part VI is a brief discussion of the differ-
ences between this Note and the seminal work in the history of
corruption-Judge John T. Noonan's Bribes.9
The whole of this Note uses the phrase "corrupt state of mind
requirement" and the term "corruptly" interchangeably, despite the
nonexistence of any formal legal state of mind requirements during
the bulk of the historical time discussed.' 0 These terms represent two
contentions: first, that corrupt state of mind was an element of bribery
and extortion at common law, and second, that corrupt state of mind
at common law meant that the defendant knew that his conduct was
unlawful.
I. COMMON LAw HISTORY: FINDING AND DEFINING "CORRUPTLY"
Extortion and bribery are behaviors modern society considers
positively illegal and normatively wrong. Judge John T. Noonan sug-
gests that the very word "bribe" first appeared in the English language
in Geoffrey Chaucer's The Canterbury Tales'I as "a metaphorical adap-
tation of the French briber, to eat greedily."12 History, however, dem-
onstrates that some level of reciprocity between rulers and ruled has
7 Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996).
8 United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
9 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
10 See infra note 18.
11 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Friar's Prologue and Tale, in THE CANTERBURY TALES 220
11. 1350-52 (N.F. Blake ed. 1980) ("This somnour euere waityng on his pray, / For to
somne an old wydewe, a ribibe, / Feynynge a cause for he wolde brybd'.... (emphasis
added)).
12 NOONAN, supra note 9, at 747 n.63; see also 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 536
(2d ed. 1989) (attributing the first known English use of "bribe" to Chaucer).
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been the norm rather than the exception in many times and t*laces. -13
Over the last few centuries, Western society has broken from the glob-
ally shared cultural norm of reciprocity, and reached a consensus in
law about the impropriety of private takings by public officials.' 4 It is
to this uniquely Western history, particularly the history of England,
that this Note turns.
It would seem odd if such pedigreed' 5 laws as those prohibiting
extortion and bribery had survived for centuries without answers to
questions covering the scope of their prohibition and their requisite
state of mind. Indeed, such is not the case. The common law history
of extortion and bribery demonstrates that, from their inception until
the end of the eighteenth century, these crimes had a uniformly ac-
cepted scope and state of mind, embodied in the word "corruptly."
According to Morrisetle, "Where Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries
of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word .... ,,16 Part of the "cluster of
ideas" historically attached to the "borrowed word" extortion is a cor-
13 See NOONAN, supra note 9, at 3 ("Reciprocity is in any society a rule of life, and
in some societies at least it is the rule of life."); see also infra note 375 (discussing the
historical and cultural ubiquity of reciprocity).
Presumably, the modern conception of reciprocity is based at least in part on a
shared commitment to the modern state's conception of the rule of law. This, how-
ever, is not necessarily the case:
[T]he modern state is not the only effective form of rule: organized crime,
for example, functions quite well under different rules. The Mafia that pro-
tects and exploits Italian immigrants in some American cities and immigrant
workers in France performs a "public" function. It administers justice in an
immigrant population and, relying on ethnic solidarity, protects it from a
hostile society. It must serve its community well or risk losing credibility; by
serving the interests of its clients, it rules paternally, and it is particularly
assiduous in this because otherwise it could never extort money from the
immigrants it is supposed to protect. Whoever protects controls, and whoever
controls pillages.
I A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: FROM PAGAN ROME ro BYZANTIUM 96-97 (Paul Veyne
ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1987) [hereinafter HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE] (em-
phasis added).
14 "The honest functionary is a peculiarity of modern Western nations." Id. at 97;
see also NOONAN, supra note 9, passim.
15 The Statute of Westminster 1, 1275, 3 Edw., c. 26 (Eng.), was the earliest statu-
tory prohibition against extortion and bribery. At common law, extortion and bribery
were not well-distinguished crimes. SeeJames Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between
Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815 passim
(1988).
16 Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). In Evans, the Supreme
Court indicated the relevance of English common law to the Hobbs Act by citing
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rupt state of mind. Including this state of mind in the Hobbs Act
would not only be formally correct under Morrisette, but would also
functionally help to clear much of the smoke of modern judicial con-
fusion in this area while providing the foundation for an effective and
principled boundary to federal extortion.
Despite its grounding in the common law, the modern judiciary
frequently treats "corruptly" as a vestigial appendage to the statutes in
which it is found. 17 Corrupt state of mind is not, however, one of
many largely inconsequential inconsistencies inevitable in a legal
structure that grows organically rather than systemically. It is instead a
term of art capable of principled meaning and application. This Part
will discuss the relevant history by: (1) establishing the proper histori-
cal background, (2) demonstrating that corrupt state of mind was an
element of extortion at common law, and (3) drawing a definition of
"corruptly" from common law cases and treatises.
A. Historical Context
At common law, the corrupt state of mind requirement possessed
remarkable versatility.18 First, the corrupt state of mind element auto-
matically adjusted itself to the particular case and officer. To act cor-
ruptly, an official had to violate the customs and laws pertaining to his
particular office knowingly, that is, he had to act with a subjective un-
lawful purpose. By requiring both knowledge of fact and knowledge
of law,19 the corrupt state of mind requirement allowed the law suffi-
cient delicacy to draw principled legal boundaries between legitimate
and illegal behavior in a complex system where (much like American
legislators) public officials were paid by both Crown and countrymen.
several English cases, the earliest of which was decided in 1298 A.D. Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 271 n.23 (1992).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 144 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002) (using a
quid pro quo test to display corrupt state of mind in federal bribery under 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2000)).
18 One important consideration to keep in mind is that the term mens rea may
be only loosely applied to pre-nineteenth century case law. Formal requirements of
intent did not gain ascendancy in the law until sometime after 1770, near the time
where this historical analysis ends. SeeJOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 205-06 (4th
ed. 2000).
When this Note speaks of intent in the historical context, it refers not to a formal
element of a crime, but rather to whatever mental state the courts generally under-
stood to be necessary to the crime's commission.
19 This "knowledge of law" on the part did not have to be actual knowledge of
statutory law. Many of the fees collected by public officials were in amounts dictated
by custom. Knowingly exceeding the customary fee would have been as corrupt as
knowingly violating a positive legal boundary on fee collection.
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In a system lacking well-defined rules about what public officials may
take or request, a state of mind element capable of so differentiating
between licit and illicit conduct was a necessary lubricant to the
wheels of governmental process. Second, the corrupt state of mind
element limited the scope of extortion and bribery in a principled
manner by exempting subjectively innocent actors from liability. Cor-
rupt state of mind remained the guidepost to extortion and bribery
law until the beginning of the nineteenth century, where history
shows that the corrupt state of mind element became somehow lost to
the common law.2 11
20 That corrupt state of mind became lost as a dominant principle in the com-
mon law is evident. See, e.g., Field Code, ch. 15, § 613, 1848 N.Y. Laws at 220 (1865)
[hereinafter Field Code]. The Field Code cites People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1827), as its principle color of right extortion case. Field Code, supra, at § 613
cmt. VWaley required a corrupt state of mind for color of right extortion. Whaley, 6
Cow. at 663-64. Despite its reliance on Wialey, the Field Code codifies color of right
extortion as a strict liability crime.
A partial explanation of "corruptly's" lost status may inhere in the historical
movement towards codification. Codifications of the common law that did not in-
clude an express corrupt state of mind element, such as the Field Code, may have
obscured the common law definition of color of right extortion. One logical conse-
quence of this theory would be that the federal government, which relied on the Field
Code in drafting the Hobbs Act, might suffer a more acute ignorance of corrupt in-
tent than the states; and such is in fact the current state of affairs. See inira, Part III;
see also Cleavland v. State, 34 Ala. 254, 254 (1859) (deciding that a state statute pun-
ishing any taking by a public official, even though it did not have an intent element,
could not reach an official with "the bona-fide belief that the services had been ren-
dered, and that the fee was legally due. . . . [A deliberate violation of known law]
constitutes the corrupt intent which is the essence of the offense."); Hood v. State,
245 S.W. 176, 176 (Ark. 1922) (reversing a conviction for extortion because "the in-
dictment fails to charge appellant with having received the warrant corruptly and
under color of office. These [charges] are essential elements of extortion"); People v.
Clark, 151 N.E. 631, 636 (N.Y. 1926) (stating that, although illegal takings statute of
the charge did not contain an intent element, "[t]here can be no intent to do the
prohibited act unless the defendant knows that he is asking or receiving some reward
which is illegal"); State v. Pritchard, 12 S.E. 50, 51 (N.C. 1890) (asserting that "in
order to prove [extortion] it is necessary to show that the fees were demanded will-
fully and corruptly, and not through any mistake of law or fact"); Haynes v. Hall, 37
Vt. 20, 22 (1864) (holding that, to violate a state statute punishing the taking of illegal
fees, "it is necessary that the officer receiving such fees should do it with a knowledge
of the illegality of the act to constitute it an offense, subjecting him to the penalty").
But see State v. Dickens, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 406, 407 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796) (hold-
ing that "every officer is bound to know what the law is upon the subject of fees to be
taken by himself. He cannot excuse himself from taking more than the legal fee by
[claiming good faith]."); Lewis v. State, 64 S.W.2d 972, 974-96 (Tex. Crim. App.
1933) (holding that, where the statute is clear, a good faith mistake of law is no de-
fense to color of right extortion).
17,36 [VOL. 78:5
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At common law, extortion was the earliest and broadest formula-
tion of the law against corruption.21 Proscriptions against corrupt be-
havior first gained prominence in the Statute of Westminster I in
1275.22 Understanding the history of corrupt state of mind requires a
brief explanation of English social and political history between the
thirteenth and late eighteenth centuries.
Public officials of the time, particularly the sheriff, carried a
broad range of powers, and such officials were only loosely accounta-
ble to any central authority.23 Dr. Austin Poole noted:
The chief agent of the Crown in local government was the sheriff.
... He was at the head of the fiscal, judicial, administrative, and
military organization of the shire. He was responsible for the reve-
nues due from the shire, for which he was accounted twice a year at
Easter and Michaelmas at the exchequer; to him were the king's
writs addressed, and it was his duty to execute the king's instruc-
tions .... 24
The sheriff was accompanied in his administration of local affairs by a
host of other officials, including coroners, jailers, bailiffs, and justices
of the peace.25
Although the sheriff exercised a wide variety of judicial, adminis-
trative, and law-enforcement responsibilities, Frederic William
Maitland defined the office in terms of one primary economic duty:
"the profits of the market and court seem to have been farmed [col-
lected yearly by the King in round sums] .... The farmer seems to
have been the sheriff .... "26 Although the sheriff was revenue collec-
tor, administrator, and law enforcer for the king, he received little or
no compensation from the crown for his duties. The sheriffs (and
other public officials) lived on fees collected from those they served. 27
Sir William Holdsworth noted that "certain of the officials of the local
government were paid indirectly by fees exacted for certain activi-
ties-the clerk of the peace, the sheriffs, the justices of the peace...
21 See supra note 15.
22 Statute of Westminster 1, 1275, 3 Edw., c. 26 (Eng.); see also 2 WILLIAM HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 290 (4th ed. 1936).
23 See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 24-25.
24 AUSTIN LANE POOLE, FROM DOMESDAY BOOK TO MACNA CARTA: 1087-1216, at
387 (1951).
25 See id. at 389-92.
26 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND: THREE ESSAYS IN
THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 204 (1907).
27 See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 24-27; MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 204;
POOLE, supra note 24, at 387.
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and the coroners, were paid in this way." 28 Administrative officials
were not alone in living on payments from their constituents; judges
also charged fees to those they served. 29 Holdsworth commented that
the "royal officials, even the judges, were both poorly and irregularly
paid [by the Crown]."""1
The fees collected by public officials were generally fixed-some
by law, and others by custom."1 In fact, the law of the time held many
civilians (particularly those whose position implied a fiduciary trust
subject to abuse or marketeering, such as millers,3 2 ferrymen,'3  and
ecclesial officers3 4) legally liable as public officials under charges of
extortion for exceeding customary rates and charges, despite the fact
that these civilians were not employed by the Crown.3 5
Although sheriffs and other public officials received poor salaries
and were legally limited in their capacity to charge the public for their
services, "[t]he office of sherrif was evidently a lucrative one. Men
were prepared to pay a high price to be appointed. ' -3 6 The source of
the sheriffs' revenue, and for that matter the revenue of the coroners,
judges, jailers, and other public officials, was a blatant and widespread
disregard for legal and customary limits on their fees.17 Holdsworth
noted the "widespread corruption of the constantly increasing tribe of
royal officials,"3 8 and Poole asserted "that [the sheriffs] were often ra-
28 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 153.
29 1 id. at 255.
30 2 id. at 294.
31 Statutes such as 1586, 29 Eliz., c. 4-5 (Eng.) list with explicit detail the rates
and fees the named public officials were bound to follow in the administration of
their duties. Many fees were not listed by any statute, but were instead fixed as a
matter of custom venerated enough to carry the force of law. See I FREDERICK POL-
LOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD 1, at 183 (2d ed. 1952) ("The unenacted part-and this is the great bulk-
of the law seems to be conceived as custom (consuetudo)."). St. Thomas More re-
marked upon the static nature of the feudal economic system, commenting that "even
if the number of sheep should increase greatly, their price will not fall a penny."
THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 20 (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1516).
32 Rex. v. Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB. 1694).
33 Rex. v. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1693).
34 Lake's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 677 (K.B. 1591).
35 Two cases particularly support this point. In Roberts, a ferryman was convicted
of extortion for accepting double the customary ferry rate. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. at
286. In Wadsworth, the court similarly convicted a miller of extortion for exceeding
the customary rates Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. at 489.
36 POOLE, supra note 24, at 388.




pacious and oppressive .... ,,39 A testament to the thoroughness of
corruption by public officials, particularly the sheriffs, lies in the crea-
tion of the office of coroner. Diana E.S. Dunn documented:
The office of coroner was established in 1194. Shrieval corruption
had long been a problem to the Crown, depriving it of much poten-
tial revenue, and royal finances were in a particularly parlous state
at this time because of the enormous ransom which had been de-
manded for the release of Richard 1, who was captured while on
crusade. The establishment of the office of coroner was intended to
act as a check on the activities of sheriffs and to ensure thatjudicial
revenue, such an important part of the king's income, reached his
coffers.40
The history of extortion under color of official right is best under-
stood against the backdrop of this complex interaction of weak central
regulation, unsalaried and fee-reliant public officials, and custom.
This complex system was the background for all of the law against
corruption, particularly that proscribing extortion and bribery. From
the time of the Statute of Westminster I in 1275 to the end of the
eighteenth century, there was no meaningful distinction between the
state of mind elements for these two crimes.41 Bribes (unlawful tak-
ings by judges42 or voters,43 or the sale of unsaleable public offices44)
and extortions (takings by ecclesial officers45 or administrative offi-
cials46 under color of right) were considered similarly corrupt,47 and
required the same corrupt state of mind under the law. Accordingly,
this Note treats extortion, bribery, and oppression 48 interchangeably
39 POOLE, supra note 24, at 387.
40 DIANA E.S. DUNN, COURTS, COUNTIES AND THE CAPITAL IN THE LATER MIDDLE
AGES 95 (1996).
41 See generally Lindgren, supra note 15, at 824-25 (arguing that proscriptions
against corruption were designed to punish improper takings by public officials with-
out making any meaningful distinction between whether those takings were "extor-
tion" or "bribery").
42 See, e.g., The Mayor of Lynns Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1586).
43 See, e.g., Bush v. Ralling, 96 Eng. Rep. 883 (K.B. 1756); Rex v. Plympton, 92
Eng. Rep. 397 (K.B. 1724); Rex v. Mayor of Tiverton, 88 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1723).
44 See, e.g., Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308 (K.B. 1769); Stockwell v. North, 74
Eng. Rep. 1068 (K.B. 1669).
45 See, e.g., Rex v. Loggen, 93 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1797); Rex v. Eyres, 82 Eng.
Rep. 1123 (K.B. 1667).
46 See, e.g., Longvills Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1665); Dive v. Maningham, 75
Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1550).
47 See Lindgren, supra note 15, at 837-82; see also 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22,
at 564-74.
48 Courts typically used the word oppression to describe fear or force extortion,
but occasionally used it as a synonym for extortion tinder color of official right. See
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for the purpose of defining the corrupt state of mind element at com-
mon law.
B. The Presence of "Corruptly" in Common-Law Extortion
Examination of the case law reveals a surprisingly consistent
agreement across centuries about what mental state imputed guilt for
extortion and bribery, that is, what constituted a "corrupt" mind.
That this common thread is often implied in the text rather than ex-
pressly stated is of little moment, particularly because formal state-of-
mind requirements were not dominant features of the law of the
time.49 Further, the idea of a corrupt mind was likely well enough
understood at the time to require little discussion. Despite a dearth of
direct treatment of the corrupt state of mind at common law, an os-
tensive definition of corruptly is possible through analysis of the facts,
holdings, and dicta of common law materials. 51 1 Ostensive definition
is arguably the more appropriate way to define an element of a com-
mon-law crime. 5'
Extortion and bribery were virtually indistinguishable common-
law crimes, and bribery at common law expressly required a corrupt
state of mind. 52 This state of mind is suggested in the 1762 case Rex v.
Williams,5 3 where justices of the peace who withheld alehouse licenses
as a retribution for the plaintiffs' refusal to vote for them were tried
for extortion, even though improper attempts to influence voters
An Act to Prevent Occasional Freemen From Voting at Elections of Members to Serve
in Parliament For Cities and Boroughs, 1763, 3 Geo. 3, c. 15 (Eng.) (typifying color of
right extortive behavior as "extortion, injustice, and oppression"); see also Stockwel4 74
Eng. Rep. at 1068 (finding the Sheriff of Nottingham's unlawful sale of the offices of
jailer and bailywick a "corruption, and a great cause of oppression"). For the pur-
poses of this Note, oppression will be subsumed under the broader category of extor-
tion as it was at common law.
49 See supra note 18.
50 Connotative definition clarifies word meaning by substituting synonyms in the
manner of a dictionary. Ostensive definition describes by example. For instance, the
connotative definition of a sphere would be "the three dimensional shape described
by the movement of one point a fixed distance from another stationary point." By
contrast, an ostensive definition of a sphere might involve finding a well-fonned mar-
ble, and indicating that a sphere is something like this.
51 G. Robert Blakey, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal
Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, app. A.
52 Bush v. Ralling, 96 Eng. Rep. 883, 883-84 (K.B. 1756) (characterizing bribery
as the corruption of a public official); see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1) (2000) (requiring
a finding of corrupt intent for bribery by public officials).
53 97 Eng. Rep. 851 (K.B. 1762).
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were more commonly typified as bribery. 54 Further, the court ex-
pressly found that the justices proceeded "from a corrupt motive,"
that is, an unlawful purpose; further, this finding was necessary to the
conviction. 55
In the 1740 case Rex v. Seymour and Others,56 three justices of the
peace were convicted (but not under the aforementioned statute) of
extortion for requiring foreigners to pay ten shillings for a license to
run an alehouse, when one shilling was the customary amount.57 The
defendant justices' guilt for extortion hinged upon their demand for
a payment to which they knew they were unentitled.58 Once again, pur-
poseful impropriety beyond the act of taking played an important role
in the determination of guilt. Rex v. Young and Pitts, Esq.,5 9 falling
chronologically between Seymour and Williams, was decided in 1758.
In Young, two justices of the peace were charged with oppression for
refusing to grant an alehouse license to one Henry Day.61 The court
held that the justices could not be subjected to an information unless
"partiality, corruption, or malice shall clearly appear. ' 61 As demon-
strated by the following passage, the court's determination of crimi-
nality hinged on the justices' state of mind: "[i]f their judgment is
wrong, yet their heart and intention pure, God forbid that they should
be punished! . . .The present question therefore only is, whether
these gentlemen have been guilty of any partiality or malice (for cor-
ruption is not pretended,) ...... 62 The court was unwilling to find
guilt unless the judges had acted with an impure heart; or, in terms
more friendly to the modern legal imagination, an unlawful purpose.
Although Williams dealt with both behavior commonly consid-
ered extortion (improperly exercising power for profit by withholding
a license) and behavior commonly considered bribery (influencing
voters) at the same time, Young demonstrated that the same corrupt
state of mind requirement attached to an extortion charge divorced
from any charge of bribery. Further, the horror expressed in Young at
attributing guilt to one innocent in purpose suggests that the corrupt
54 See, e.g., Rex v. Mayor of Tiverton, 88 Eng. Rep. 136, 136 (K.B. 1723); see also
Bush, 96 Eng. Rep. at 883.
55 Williams, 97 Eng. Rep. at 851.
56 87 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1740).
57 Id. at 1305-06.
58 Id. at 1306.
59 97 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1758).
60 Id. at 447.
61 Id. at 450.
62 Id.
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state of mind requirement wns a common and deeply held assumption
of the law.
In a large number of extortion cases, courts convicted public offi-
cials of extortive behavior with no reference at all to state of mind. 63
The existence of these cases does not challenge this Note's theory of
"corruptly," largely because the idea of "state of mind" as it is currently
conceived was not an ascendant concept in the law prior to the nine-
teenth century. 64 Rather these cases, by their generalized type, pro-
vide support for the theory. Viewed broadly, these cases all deal with
public officials who allegedly accepted, demanded, or took fees
greater than those set by statute or custom. Many of the cases contain
nothing but a bare description of facts and the holding, but all the
cases contain two common elements: (1) a fee was taken, and (2) the
taker knew that the amount taken was inappropriate. The bulk of
cases that convicted public officers of corruption without discussing
state of mind concerned public officers or quasi-officers that violated
a customary, rather than a statutory fee. 65 Because custom is by na-
ture a practice of which all members of the society are aware, 66 argu-
ment over whether or not a particular defendant knew that he was
violating the customs associated with his office would have served little
purpose for the litigants or the court; given the definitional preva-
lence of custom, discussion of the defendant's knowledge thereof
would likely have proven irrelevant or futile. As a result, the defen-
dant's state of mind in such cases commonly remained undiscussed.
Many such cases include no discussion beyond bare facts describing
63 See, e.g., Miller v. Aris, 170 Eng. Rep. 598 (N.P. 1800); Hescott's Case, 91 Eng.
Rep. 291 (K.B. 1795); Stotesbury v. Smith, 97 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1760); Williams v.
Lyons, 88 Eng. Rep. 138 (K.B. 1724); Rex v. Colvin, 88 Eng. Rep. 162 (K.B. 1723); Rex
v. Tracy, 87 Eng. Rep. 795 (K.B. 1704); Rex v. Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.
1694); Rex v. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1693); Anonymus, 87 Eng. Rep. 162
(K.B. 1688); Rex v. Broughton, 83 Eng. Rep. 455 (K-B. 1673); Troy, an Attorney, 88
Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1669); Stockwell v. North, 74 Eng. Rep. 1669 (K.B. 1669); Rex v.
Eyres, 82 Eng. Rep. 1123 (K.B. 1667); Badow v. Salter, 82 Eng. Rep. 34 (K.B. 1625);
Empson v. Bathurst, 123 Eng. Rep. 1095 (C.P. 1622); Beawfage's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1076 (K.B. 1600); Dive v. Maningham, 75 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1550).
64 See supra note 18 (noting the historical development of intent as a concept in
the law).
65 See An Act to Prevent Occasional Freemen From Voting at Elections of Mem-
bers to Serve in Parliament for Cities and Boroughs, 1763, 3 Geo. 3, c. 15 (Eng.).
66 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, custom in the sense used here
means "[a] n established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of a
law or right .. "4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 167. In instances
where an alleged extortioner demanded more than a customary fee, his knowledge of
the custom would likely be presumed due to the prevalence of knowledge inherent in
the idea of custom.
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the conduct and a verdict.67 Cases dealing with customary fees often
extended the class of liability beyond public officials to include some
civilians, whose fiduciary positions were bounded by customary fees
such as millers, ferrymen, and the clergy. 68 Far from undermining the
existence or meaning of the corrupt state of mind requirement, these
"intentless" cases serve only to emphasize the ubiquity of societal cus-
toms and the lack of a formal conception of state of mind.
Some of the cases where state of mind and knowledge were not at
issue were predicated upon the violation of statutory rather than cus-
tomary fee limits. Statutory convictions tended to generate more state
of mind related discussions than custom-based cases did, indicating
that such discussion was less relevant to custom cases (where a defen-
dant's knowledge of the "law" was circumstantially easy to infer as an
issue of fact) than it was to statutory conviction (where a defendant's
knowledge of the law was not circumstantially assured). In Beawfage's
Case,69 the court convicted a sheriff of improperly taking money from
a prisoner. Beawfage was tried under a statute that limited the sheriff
to collecting from someone only "to be a true prisoner or to pay for
his meat and drink .... -70 On its face, the statute had no state of
mind element.7' Interpreting the statute, the court commented, "the
statute was made to avoid perjury, extortion, and oppression. z72 As a
matter of logic, the legal fees listed in the statute could not have
helped public officials to follow the law, nor could the statute itself
have prevented the listed crimes, unless knowledge of the statute had
a bearing on commission of the crime-that is, a corrupt state of
mind requirement.
Treatises interpreting the common law affirm the conclusion that
common law extortion had a corrupt state of mind element. John
Prentiss Bishop stated that "it is always held that extortion proceeds
only from a corrupt mind.'' 73 Wharton commented that "as to extor-
tion at common law, and under most of the statutes, corrupt motive is
essential."' 74 Perkins and Boyce concurred, stating that "there is a spe-
cial element which constitutes the mens-rea of the crime [extortion],
67 See supra note 63.
68 See supra notes 32-34.
69 77 Eng. Rep. 1076 (K.B. 1600).
70 23 Hen. 6 c., 10. (Eng.)
71 Id.
72 Beawfage's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1081.
73 2JOHN PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAw 328 (John M. Zane & Carl
Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1923).
74 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 1906 (12th ed. 1932) (em-
phasis added).
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and this is corruption. Because of this fact extortion is not committed
by the officer who innocently receives an unlawful fee as a result of an
honest mistake of fact or law."17 5 Clark and Marshall stated that to
"constitute extortion at common law, and very generally under the
statutes, there must be a corrupt intent. '76
Using extortion and bribery as our definitional bases for "cor-
ruptly," we now proceed to the ostensive process of defining corruptly.
One well-accepted definition of common-law extortion comes from
William Hawkins' A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown.77 Hawkins stated:
It is said, that extortion in a large sense signifies any oppression
under colour of right; but that in a strict sense it signifies the taking
of money by any officer, by colour of his office, either where none at
all is due, or not so much is due, or where it is not yet due. 78
While Hawkins provided a functional definition of the actus reus of
extortion (with which a wide variety of legal scholars have agreed) ,79
75 ROLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 446-47 (3d ed. 1982)
(emphasis added).
76 WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES
795 (6th ed. 1958) (emphasis added).
77 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF TH-E PLEAS OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824).
78 1 id. at 418.
79 Hawkins's treatise, originally published 1716, is the first in a long line of trea-
tises that support this Note's view of the corrupt state of mind requirement in color of
right extortion. Chronologically, these are 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141 (orig-
inally published 1769) ("[Elxtortion is an abuse of public justice, which consists in any
officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing
of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due."); 3JOsEPH
CHrIy, THE CRIMINAL LAw 293 n.(q) (1816) ("Where a statute annexes a fee to an
office, it will be extortion to take more than it specifies.... [but] [w]here nothing at
all is due, that fact ought to be averred, and where any thing was due, the sum that
ought to have been lawfully taken must be expressed."); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREA-
TISE ON rHIE CRIMINAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 2519 (7th ed. 1874) (originally
published 1846) ("Extortion, in its general sense, signifies any oppression by color of
right; but technically it may be defined to be the taking of money by an officer, by
reason of his office, either where none is due, or none is yet due."); CI.ARK & MAR-
SHALL, supra note 76, at 794 (originally published 1863) ("Extortion is the obtaining
of the property of another, with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force or
fear or tinder the color of official right."); JAMES FrrZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 112 (Frederick Sturge ed., 9th ed. 1950) (originally published 1877)
("If the illegal act consists in taking under the colour of office from any person any
money or valuable thing which is not due from him at the time when it is taken, the
offence is called 'extortion' . . . . Extortion, in its general sense, signifies any oppres-
sion by color of right; but technically it may be defined to be the taking of money by
an officer, by reason of his office, either where none is due, or none is yet due."); 2
EMLIN MCCLAIN, THE CRIMINAL LAw 129 (1897) ("The [extortion] indictment should
charge not only the taking of unlawful fees, but the facts showing the fees to be unlaw-
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he does not state a mens rea for the offense. Nevertheless, Hawkins
suggested a state of mind requirement when he later explicated that
"the chief danger of oppression is from officers being left at their lib-
erty to set their own rates on their labour, and make their own de-
mands; but there cannot be so much fear of these abuses while they
are restrained to known and stated fees." 80
Hawkins made two assumptions. First, Hawkins assumed that
laws against extortion were designed to curb abuse by requiring offi-
cials to adhere to "stated fees." Second, Hawkins assumed that to
commit extortion, the official must know that he is violating the stated
fees. While these implications alone may not comprise incontrovert-
ible authority, their constant reaffirmation in the case law suggests
their correctness. Although Hawkins's extortion definition (and the
definitions of the long line of treatise writers that rely upon it) has no
express corrupt state of mind requirement, such a state of mind re-
quirement was nevertheless assumed.8 1  Omitting "corruptly" alto-
gether is a mistake unique to the modern law.
C. The Meaning of Corruptly at Common Law
In Rex v. Clerk of the Peace of Cumberland,82 a judicial clerk was ac-
cused of taking "more than his just fee and due. '8 3 While this was an
otherwise typical charge of color-of-right extortion, the opinion con-
tained uncommonly useful commentary from the bench. 4 One of
the defendant's objections to the indictment was that the indictment
did not show with particularity how much the clerk took, how much
he was entitled to take, and his reason for taking more than he was
allowed. 85 Dissenting from the conviction, Justice Holt commented
that "[e]xtortion is a specific offence ... he said he took ten shillings
more than his fee; why this may be, for perhaps he had another de-
ful. It should state what was demanded and received, and ... what was due; and it
must be charged that what was received was for official services."); PERKINS & BOYCE ,
supra note 75, at 443 (characterizing conmmon law extortion as the corrupt collection
of an unlawful fee by an officer under color of office, "with no proof of threat, force,
or duress required" (quoting United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir.
1980))).
80 1 HAWKINS, supra note 77, at 419 (emphasis added).
81 See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
82 88 Eng. Rep. 908, 908 (K.B. 1706).
83 Id.
84 The majority of the cases from this period and area of the law generally record
only a bare record of the facts and the holding, with minimal discussion.
85 Cumberland, 88 Eng. Rep. at 909.
2003] 1745
1746 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:5
mand upon him."' 3 Holt's dissent demonstrates that the required
mental state exceeded mere knowledge that the official was collecting
a fee. Holt implied that the clerk, to have a corrupt mind, needed to
not only intend his actions, he needed to understand the propriety of
his actions in light of the law. Holt dissented because the court
wanted to attribute guilt to a person whose unlawful purpose re-
mained unproven.8 7 Ultimately, the law followed Holt's dissent in-
stead of Cumberlands holding.
Following Holt both in time and in law, the court in Rex v. Go-
ver-8 affirmed an extortion conviction because the defendant "color
officii extorsive injuriose he took money, and sheweth not for what
matter or cause."8 - The court indicated that, if the defendant had
been able to show cause (in other words, had proof of a lawful pur-
pose), no conviction would lie. 11
The idea that the corrupt mind knows that it is violating the law is
further emphasized in Rex v. Vaughan.91 In Vaughan, the defendant
was convicted of bribegiving for offering to buy a clerkship at the Su-
preme Court of Jamaica. The court found that the defendant
Vaughan, when offering to buy the office from Duke Grafton, made
special arrangements that the dealings between himself and the Duke
remain secret. t2 Vaughan claimed in response that he believed the
office was saleable, and that the secrecy surrounding the sale was the
product of Duke Grafton's fears that the transaction was a political
trap."" The court convicted Vaughan of bribery, -4 and the center-
piece of its deliberation was whether or not Vaughan believed that the
office was saleable.9 5 The secrecy with which he undertook the trans-
action proved his undoing, as the court convicted him upon the rea-
soning that "all [the circumstances] prove that he himself looked
upon it as an unjustifiable transaction." 96
Vaughan's guilt hinged upon whether or not he believed that his
offer to buy the office was legitimate-not whether or not the office
86 Id. (Holt, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Holt, J., dissenting).
88 83 Eng. Rep. 992, 992 (K.B. 1663).
89 Id.
90 d.
91 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 308 (K.B. 1769).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 309. Ironically, Duke Grafton's alleged fears would serve as circumstan-
tial evidence that the sale was "corrupt"-that is, that both parties knew that the trans-
action was not entirely appropriate under the law.
94 Id. at 310-11.
95 See id. at 308-10.
96 Id. at 3 10.
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actually was saleable. This is a telling statement on the court's concep-
tion of "corruptly." Bribery and extortion required a special mental
state: the perpetrator had to know that his behavior contradicted cus-
tom or law. In the words of the Vaughan court, the perpetrator had to
know that he conducted an "unjustifiable transaction.."9 7
The notion that a corrupt state of mind involves awareness of ille-
gality is further supported in Rex v. Young and Pitts, Esq.9s Young pro-
vides a glance at conduct the courts were sure did not proceed from a
corrupt mind. In Young, the court admitted that "corruption is not
pretended" concerning the defendants' state of mind.9 9 The justices'
conduct (i.e., refusing to grant a license) was not extortion, regardless
of whether their decision was based on dislike, favoritism, or other
ignoble but legal uses of discretion. The court implied what manner
of mental state it would have found culpable when it asked, "why are
[the defendants] liable to be called to account . ..unless they act
faultily and willfully wrong?"' 00 Because the court required action
"faultily and willfully"" wrong for guilt, Young, like Cumberland and
Vaughan, must be read to hold that corrupt purpose is an unlawful
purpose, involving knowledge of both fact and law.
Not only did corrupt state of mind at common law involve both
knowledge of fact and knowledge of law, it involved knowledge of fact
and of particular law. Because every public official could collect a dif-
ferent set of legal and customary fees, the official could only be guilty
of extortion if the court found that he deliberately violated the fee
schedule attached to his particular office. Evidence for this proposi-
tion lies in the plain fact of existence of elaborate statutory fee
schemes for public officials that overlaid the pre-existing social cus-
toms. 10 2 The case law also bears out this interpretation. In Floyd and
St. Tho Cannon's Case,'0 3 the court declared that "if a man exihibiteth
against another man for extortion, there the sum certaine which he
did extort, must be laid out particularly in the bill."104 Similarly, in
Lake's Case,'0 5 the court commented, "if no fee be due, the same
ought to appear in the judgment."'' 06 In Rex v. Tracy'07 the court re-
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 97 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1758).
99 Id. at 450.
100 Id. at 448.
101 Id.
102 Id.; see also 1586 29 Eliz. c. 4-5 (Eng.).
103 78 Eng. Rep. 257, 257 (K.B. 1628).
104 Id.
105 74 Eng. Rep. 677, 677 (K.B. 1591).
106 Id.
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fused to convict the defendant because the prosecution failed to show
that the defendant had taken anything to which he particularly was
unentitled.I"8 The court in Cumberland summarized the point well
when it declared "where there is a charge of extortion, it must be par-
ticularized."'119 Extortion at common law, therefore, was an offense
particular to the legal limits of the office involved, and knowledge of
that law was an element of corrupt state of mind.
The court in Dive v. ManinghamI I" convicted a sheriff of extortion
for setting an unbailable prisoner free in return for an illegal fee. Dis-
cussing the nature of official right, the court commented, "this word
colore officii sui is always taken ... in malam partem, and signifies an
act badly done under the countenance of office . . .and is properly
called extortion." " Although the court made no direct reference to
Maningham's state of mind, the court's description of the crime shows
that, for guilt to attach, the taking must have been "in malam partem"
or have been "badly done."'1 2 The court, by its language, assumed
that the statute included a corrupt state of mind element.
In short, the case law ostensively defines "corruptly" as an unlaw-
ful purpose, that is, as the purpose to give, take, receive, or accept,
anything of value that is illegal or inappropriate to that particular of-
fice, knowing that it is illegal or inappropriate. "Corruptly" involves
both knowledge of fact (the defendant must know what he is ac-
cepting or taking) and knowledge of law (the defendant must know
that what he is accepting or taking is inappropriate to his office). The
treatises bear out this interpretation.
Wharton contended that corrupt behavior could only occur
"above all with knowledge that [the taking or receiving] was wrong
.... ,II" Clark and Marshall described corruptly as follows: "it is not
enough to show that unlawful fees were demanded and received, but
it must appear that they were demanded and received corruptly, and,
according to the better opinion, not under any mistake either of law
or fact.""14 Stephen followed this interpretation when he claimed that
"an illegal exercise of authority, caused by a mistake as to the law,
made in good faith, is not a misdemeanor [of extortion]."" 5 McClain
107 87 Eng. Rep. 795, 795 (K.B. 1703).
108 Id.
109 Rex v. Clerk of the Peace of Cumberland, 88 Eng. Rep. 908, 908 (K.B. 1706).
110 75 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1550).
111 Id. at 108.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 2 WHARTON, supra note 79, § 2517.
114 C[.ARK & MARSHALL, supra note 76, at 795.
115 STEPHEN, supra note 79, at 112.
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concurred, adding: "[A] s to the intent, the statute should be limited
to cases where there is a purpose to extort, and it may be shown by
way of defense that the officer had grounds to believe and did believe
that he was justified in taking the fees received."'1 16
The common thread amongst the treatise characterizations is
that to extort, a public officer had to be aware of his customary fees,
had willfully to obtain or accept some value, and also had to know that
the thing he obtained or accepted violated his appropriate official
dues. Thus, "corruptly" implicated both knowledge of fact and knowl-
edge of the law. That the treatises even treat mistake of law as a de-
fense to extortion-despite the general precept that ignorantia legis
neminem excusat-further supports this definition of corrupt state of
mind as embracing an unlawful purpose. Most tellingly, all of these
treatises follow Hawkins in defining extortion without an express cor-
rupt state of mind requirement.' 17
II. THE HOBBS ACT: AN INTRODUCTION AND A BRIEF HISTORY
A. An Introduction to the Statutes
Three federal crimes are particularly relevant to corruption in
the context discussed by this Note:' I bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b), ille-
gal gratuities, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c), and color of law extortion, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (b) (2). The bribery statute punishes whoever-
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises any-
thing of value to any public official or person who has been selected
to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or
any person who has been selected to be a public official to give any-
thing of value to any other person or entity, with intent-
(A) to influence any official act; or
(B) to influence such public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing,
116 2 MCCLAIN, supra note 79, at 130.
117 See supra note 79.
118 The United States Code includes six types of conduct that do (or should, in
the case of the Hobbs Act) carry a corrupt state of mind requirement. They are:
bribery, governed by 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000); illegal gratuities, covered by 18
U.S.C. § 201(c); extortion, covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (2); theft and embezzle-
ment, covered by 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (B); obstruction of justice, covered by 18
U.S.C. § 1503(a); and obstuction of the Internal Revenue laws, covered by 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212. This Note primarily addresses color of right extortion, with some commen-
tary on bribery and illegal gratuities. While the idea of corrupt state of mind ad-
vanced by this Note is also applicable to the statutes not expressly considered within
the Note, further discussion in this area would exceed this Note's scope.
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or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(C) to induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official or person;
(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any
other person or entity .... 19
Section 201(b) (2), the portion of the statute that prohibits
bribetaking by public officials, punishes much of the same conduct as
color-of-right extortion. Moreover, bribery under § 201 (b) forbids
only the corrupt donation or receipt of gifts. Although the statutes
prohibit identical conduct, the color-of-right extortion provision of
the Hobbs Act has no corrupt state of mind requirement. Following
Parts of this Note will discuss in detail the importance of requiring a
corrupt state of mind to find guilt in an alleged extortioner (or, in this
case, bribetaker, for the same rationale applies to the bribery statute).
Over- and underbreadth are both serious dangers if a properly inter-
preted corrupt state of mind element is excluded or ignored.
Section 201 (b) bribery punishes acts of the bribegiver as well as
the bribetaker. If a public official can commit color-of-right extortion
and bribetaking for the exact same transaction, then a gift that is an
extortion when accepted by a public official is also a bribe when given.
Prosecutorial discretion, then, is all that separates a color-of-right ex-
tortion victim from a bribery defendant. Reading the Hobbs Act with-
out a corrupt state of mind requirement embraces the Model Penal
Code's misguided belief that "corruptly" should be removed from the
bribery statute altogether so that those who give in to extortionate
threats can be punished.120 The solution to this conundrum is to ad-
here to the language already in the bribery statute and require that
the gift must be corrupt, that is, given with an unlawful purpose.
By contrast, the illegal gratuities statute punishes whoever
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty-
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of
value to any public official, former public official, or per-
son selected to be a public official, for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed by such public
119 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(1)-(2).
120 MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (1980) (stating that the corrupt state of mind




official, former public official, or person selected to be a
public official; or
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person se-
lected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or in-
directly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to re-
ceive or accept anything of value personally for or because
of any official act performed or to be performed by such
official or person .... 121
The primary differences between the illegal gratuities statute and
the bribery and extortion statutes are the lack of a corrupt state of
mind requirement and the punishment. The strict liability gratuities
statute carries a maximum punishment of only two years; by compari-
son, those convicted of bribery may serve five. 12
2
By further contrast, the Hobbs Act punishes anyone who
[O]bstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or at-
tempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical vio-
lence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose
to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.123
The Hobbs Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."12 4
Since the bribery and extortion statutes apply to substantially sim-
ilar conduct, 25 the most meaningful difference between the two
crimes is the facial presence of a state of mind element. While the
bribery statute requires that the exchange be made "corruptly," the
Hobbs Act has no state of mind attached to its color-ofLright language.
Formally, as demonstrated in Part I, a corrupt state of mind should be
read into the Hobbs Act. Functionally, a well-defined corrupt state of
mind is all that prevents these statutes from encompassing political
logrolling and much accepted campaign-finance activity. 126
121 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (1).
122 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), with 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c). One further difference is
that of personality: § 201 (b) bribery can punish enterprises, while the illegal gratuities
statute inflicts only personal liability. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (a).
123 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a).
124 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (2).
125 See supra Part 1.
126 The Hobbs Act, on its face, encompasses any behavior that hinders interstate
commerce by threats, force, or extorsively under color of right. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (b) (2). Although the statute does not incorporate the word corruptly on its
face, this Note argues that a corrupt state of mind was required at common law as a
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B. The History of the Hobbs Act
Morissette holds that statutory words should be read in light of
their common-law meanings unless Congress otherwise instructs the
courts. 12 7 In the face of congressional silence regarding the requisite
state of mind for a common-law crime, the "[a] bsence of contrary di-
rection may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions,
not as a departure from them." 28 Whether the courts should read a
corrupt state of mind into the Hobbs Act in accordance with Morissette
therefore depends upon whether Congress: (1) adopted common-law
extortion; or (2) having adopted common-law extortion, specifically
intended to omit the common-law state of mind. The history of the
Hobbs Act immediately reveals two relevant facts. First, Congress
adopted common-law extortion when it enacted the Hobbs Act. Sec-
ond, the focus of Congress and the Court was the control of racketeer-
ing activity, and corruption was an area on which Congress was silent.
The common-law meaning of extortion-that is, one including a cor-
rupt state of mind-should therefore obtain.
The Hobbs Act was not the first congressional effort to control
racketeering, but was born as an amendment to the Anti-Racketeering
Act of 1934.12" The Act of 1934 was passed to "protect trade and com-
merce against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or intimida-
tion."' 3'1 The 1934 Act, in relevant part, punished whoever
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or
threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or
other valuable considerations, or the purchase or rental of property
or protective services, not including, however, the payment of wages
by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of force or fear, or tinder color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or
physical injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to violate subsections (a) or (b) .... 13 1
The occasion for drafting the Act is apparent in its "Anti-Racke-
teering" moniker. Although the statute was not originally contem-
practical necessity, and should be similarly included in modern federal jurisprudence.
See Lindgren, supra note 15, at 907.
127 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
128 Id.
129 Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979, repealed by
Hobbs Act, c. 645, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(2000)).
130 Id.
131 Id. § 2(a)-(c).
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plated as a corruption control device for public officials, the statute's
language embodies such an application.
In 1933, Senate Resolution 74 of the 73rd Congress authorized a
subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce to investigate racke-
teering activity. The subcommittee, eventually called the "Copeland
Committee" after its chair, New York Senator Royal S. Copeland, filed
an interim report claiming that more than ninety-two bills introduced
to the Senate between January and June of 1934 were "designed to
close gaps in existing federal laws and to render more difficult the
activities of predatory gangs of the Kelly and Dillinger types."'1- 2 Sen-
ate Bill 2248, which would later become the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934, was among the bills described by Copeland as an effort to pun-
ish organized crime. 133 Attorney General Homer Cummings ex-
plained the bill in a letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Hatton W. Sumners: "the typical racketeering activities af-
fecting interstate commerce are those in connection with price fixing
and economic extortion directed by professional gangsters."'134 Con-
trolling political corruption was an unmentioned application of the
Act.
The debate surrounding the bill ignored the Act's potential im-
pact on public officials to the extent that no questions were raised
about the "color-of-right" language in the debates or committee re-
ports. Nowhere in the history of the Act of 1934 is there any indica-
tion that Congress recognized that the Act could be used to prosecute
political corruption, misuse of office, or political finance activity.
Instead, the debate surrounding the Act's passage focused mainly
on its potential impact on organized labor. In the letter to Congress-
man Sumners, Attorney General Cummings wrote,
The original bill was susceptible to the objection that it might in-
clude within its prohibition the legitimate and bona fide activities of
employers and employees. As the purpose of the legislation is not
to interfere with such legitimate activities but rather to set up severe
penalties for racketeering by violence, extortion, or coercion, which
affects interstate commerce, it seems advisable to definitely exclude
such legitimate activities. '3 5
The power of the labor interest in the bill became apparent during
debate on the House floor. The following exchange between Con-
132 S. REP. No. 73-1440, at 1 (1934).
133 Id. at 2.
134 Letter from Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States, to Hat-
ton W. Sumners, U.S. Representative from Texas (May 18, 1934), reprinted in PETER W.
Low & JosEPH . HOFFMAN, FEDFRAL CRIMINAL LAw 268-69 (1997).
135 Id.
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gressman Oliver of New York and Congressman Schulte typified the
debate surrounding the bill:
MR. SCHULTE: I reserve the right to object, Mr. Speaker.
MR. OLIVER of New York: This is the noted racketeering bill rec-
ommended here and agreed upon by organized labor and by the
Department of Justice. It has been agreed upon by every factor in-
volved in this kind of controversy. We have Mr. Green [President of
the American Federation of Labor] on record-
MR. SCHULTE: Has the gentleman a letter from Mr. Green which
he states he is on record in favor of this bill?
MR. OLIVER of New York: Yes.
MR. SCHULTE: If so, I shall withdraw my objection, if the gen-
tleman will show me the letter.
MR. OLIVER of New York: I cannot show the gentleman the letter,
but Mr. Green specifically agreed to it and it is stated in the report
that there is a letter from the Attorney General embodying the
agreement-
MR. SCHULTE: I do not care anything about the Attorney General.
MR. OLIVER of New York: And Mr. Green appeared before our
committee and stated before our committee that he intended to go
into a further conference-
MR. SCHULTE: Will the gentleman give me his assurance that he
has a letter from Mr. Green stating that he has agreed to this bill?
MR. OLIVER of New York: I will not say I have a letter-
MR. SCHULTE: Has the gentleman seen such a letter from Mr.
Green?
MR. OLIVER of New York: No; but I have seen an agreement in
which the Attorney General said that Mr. Green had agreed to it.136
Despite the potentially broad impact of the statutory text, Con-
gress's overwhelming concern was how the Anti-Racketeering Act
would affect organized labor. No meaningful reflection or discussion
on how the bill might affect the members of Congress themselves
occurred.
The enacted language of the 1934 Act was tailored to except or-
ganized labor activities from the statute's purview.'- 7 Seven years after
the Act's passage, the Supreme Court considered its scope in United
136 78 CON-. REC. 10,867 (1934).
137 Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 979 ("not




States v. Local 807.138 In Local 807, the Court upheld the Second Cir-
cuit's reversal of the convictions of several teamsters under the Anti-
Racketeering Act.'3 9 The Local 807, whose membership included
most of the truck drivers in New York City, had been in the practice of
meeting non-member drivers and farmers driving to market near the
city limit, stopping their vehicles, forcing them to allow a union driver
to drive the truck into the city, and then requiring payment for the
service.1 40 In response to this outrageous behavior, federal prosecu-
tors sought to punish members of the union under the Anti-Racke-
teering Act. 14' At issue was whether the hijacking non-member trucks
by union teamsters fell within "that portion of § 2(a) which excepts
from punishment any person who 'obtains or attempts to obtain, by
... threat to use force, violence or coercion.., the payment of wages
by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee."' "142 After surveying
the legislative history, the Court determined that Congress had in-
tended to protect this kind of labor activity, and had "plainly at-
tempted to distinguish militant labor activity from [racketeering] and
afford it ample protection."'143 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that, so long as the accused teamsters had a purpose to "obtain a
chance to work for a wage," they did not fall within the Act's
purview.144
The Court's construction of the Anti-Racketeering Act in Local
807was so controversial and unpopular that Congress drafted another
bill for the express purpose of overruling the decision. 1 45 "To amend
the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against inter-
ference by violence threats, coercion, or intimidation,"' Congress
passed the Act eventually codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1951-the Hobbs
Act. 146 The differences between the Hobbs Act and the Anti-Racke-
teering Act are best understood in the context of the Hobbs Act's ori-
gin as a congressional response to Local 807. The debates
surrounding passage of the Hobbs Act concentrated solely on the its
potential application to labor: "There was much vilification of ... the
Local 807 case, but . . . in spite of their broad wording, almost no
138 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
139 Id. at 539.
140 Id. at 526.
141 Id. at 524-25.
142 Id. at 527 (quoting Anti-Racketeering Act § 2(a)).
143 Id. at 531.
144 Id. at 534.
145 PETER W. Low &JosEPii L. HOFFMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 292 (1997).
146 Hobbs Act, c. 645, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2000)).
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discussion of the possible application of the bill outside the labor con-
text."' 147 The attitude surrounding the bill's passage was typified by
the following exchange from the first House debate on the bill:
MR. HALLECK: The celebrated 807 case in New York came on for
decision by the Supreme Court. The case involved the conduct of
individuals who stopped trucks going into the city of New York and
in effect hijacked the drivers .... The Supreme Court held that
under the exception [in § 2(a)] the prosecution would not lie in
that case. I know a lot of good lawyers who violently disagree with
that decision, and personally I disagree with it ....
This bill seeks to supply the deficiency created by that decision.1 48
MR. HANCOCK: [This bill] covers the most heinous crimes the
criminal statute book contemplates. It had its origin in the activities
of the Dillinger gang. All the bill does is abolish the double stan-
dard which Justice Byrnes established [in 807] and makes labor re-
sponsible for crimes just as well as those who are not laborers. That
is all it does.
MR. CELLER: I wish the gentleman's interpretation were correct,
but I fear that he is woefully in error. This bill is primarily aimed at
labor. It has a label of racketeering, it has a label of extortion, it has
a label of robbery, but it is an antilabor bill. Let us not delude our-
selves, because were it not for the so-called Teamsters' Local deci-
sion by Justice Byrnes, a labor decision, we would not have had this
bill. 149
The forgoing history demonstrates that the Hobbs Act was never
explicitly considered a weapon against political corruption. Predict-
ably, given the lack of congressional guidance, the proper application
of the "color of official right" language is now a source of controversy
in the federal courts.150 Congressional silence is in this case convinc-
ing evidence that the prosecution of political corruption was not an
explicit goal of the Hobbs Act. Although it tests the imagination to
speculate that Congress would intentionally leave a self-applicable pro-
vision of law such as color-of-right extortion to unfettered judicial in-
terpretation, they nevertheless did. The significance of this
conclusion is that the lack of a corrupt state of mind requirement on
the face of the statute was not a deliberate congressional command
regarding the elements of color-of-right extortion, because Congress
made no express commands regarding the use of the Hobbs Act as a
147 Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 145, at 298.
148 89 CONG. R.sc. 3192-93 (1943).
149 Id. at 3201.
150 See infra Parts tV-V.
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corruption control device. Rather, Congress never contemplated that
the Hobbs Act would be used to prosecute such conduct. In the light
of such congressional silence, the courts should give extortion its com-
mon-law meaning.1 5 1
Interpreting the Hobbs Act's "color-of-right" language to com-
port with common-law meaning in light of congressional silence does
not therefore leave the "color-of-right" clause undefined. The lan-
guage of the Hobbs Act was taken whole cloth from the Field Code. 152
During the second House debate over the Act, Congressman Hobbs,
the Act's sponsor, declared that "[t] he definitions in this bill are cop-
ied from the New York Code substantially."' 53 United States v. Evans,
one of the few Supreme Court decisions to address color-of-right ex-
tortion, also noted that the Hobbs Act enacted Field Code extor-
tion. 154 Because the Field Code codified the common law, Congress
by adopting it instituted a common-law extortion provision requiring
a corrupt state of mind. 55
III. THE FIELD CODE
A. The Code
The Field Code defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right."' 56 The Field Code's definition
of extortion is almost identical to the corresponding language in the
Hobbs Act extortion provision.' 5 7 The Field Code further recognizes
that, as at common law, color-of-right extortion differs substantially
from "fear and force" extortion. While the Field Code treated "fear
and force" extortion as a felony, it prescribed a different punishment
for extortion under color of right: "[e]very person who commits any
extortion under color of official right, in cases for which a different
151 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
152 See 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (stating that the language of the Hobbs Act
was taken from the Field Code); see also Field Code, supra note 20, § 613.
153 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945).
154 504 U.S. 255, 261-62, 263 n.9 (1991).
155 See supra Part II.
156 Field Code, supra note 20, § 613.
157 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2000) (defining extortion as "the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right"), with Field Code,
supra note 20, § 613 (defining extortion as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official
right"). The two differ only slightly, and only regarding force and fear extortion. The
color-of-right provisions are identical.
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punishment is not prescribed by this Code or by some of the statutes
which it specifies as continuing in force, is guilty of a
misdemeanor." 158
Although the Field Code purportedly codifies common-law extor-
tion, its definition omits a corrupt state of mind element. The reason
for the lack of a corrupt state of mind requirement may be explicable
by the Field Code's date of publication: 1865. The Field Code was
created and published well after the common-law definition of extor-
tion had become muddied and corrupt state of mind as an effective
element of color-of-right extortion had become lost. That "corruptly"
as it related to color-of-right extortion was lost, however, does not pre-
clude its validity as a part of the common law, or its adoption by the
Field Code and then the Hobbs Act.
Hints of the corrupt state of mind that should inhere in color-of-
right extortion can nevertheless be found by analyzing the Field Code.
First, the Field Code deals with extortion under "Title XV: Of Crimes
Against Property."' 5 9 Under the Field Code's classification system, ex-
tortion's neighbors include arson, burglary, forgery, larceny, embez-
zlement, and false personation. 61 1 As would be expected with
common-law crimes, all of these carry a "specific intent."16' "Willful
and malicious"'11 2 intent is required for arson; "intent to commit some
crime" 63 for burglary; "intent to defraud" 164 for forgery; "with fraud
or stealth, or without color of right thereto, and with the intent to
deprive another thereof"' 115 for larceny; "fraudulently"' 66 for embez-
zlement; and "falsely"'16 7 for false personation.
The grammatical situation of the intent within these crimes is tell-
ing. Four crimes include the disjunctive "or" in their elemental defi-
nitions: larceny, forgery, false personation, and extortion. The
larceny statute punishes "the taking of personal property accom-
plished by fraud or stealth, or without color of right thereto, and with
158 Field Code, supra note 20, § 616.
159 Id. at xlvii, 1.
160 Id. at xlvii.
161 KAPLAN EI'AL., supra note 18, at 207 (stating that all crimes for which common
law courts had defined an intent element require a 'specific' intent (citing 1 JOEL
PRENTISS BisioP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 229, 220-22 (Boston, Little &
Brown 1856))).
162 Field Code, supra note 20, § 521.
163 Id. § 540.
164 Id. §§ 553-57.
165 Id. § 584.
166 Id. § 601.
167 Id. § 620.
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intent to deprive another thereof."' 68 Each disjunct is given its own
intent element. Forgery, for example, punishes "[e]very person who,
with intent to defraud, forges, counterfeits or falsely alters."' 69 Here
the "or" is part of a list, all of whose components are covered by the
provision's intent clause. False personation has a similar setup con-
taining an intent element that covers a disjunctive list of culpable con-
duct, although there the list is more lengthy.' 70
Although it also contains a disjunctive clause, the extortion provi-
sion has a slightly different structure. The Field Code, like the Hobbs
Act modeled upon it, defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right."' 71 The difference between the
"fear and force" extortion and "color-of-right" extortion is emphasized
in a footnote to the definition of larceny. The Field Code states, "in
extortion there is again a taking. Now it is with the consent of the
party injured; but this is a consent induced by threats, or under color
of official right."' 7 2 The "color-of-right" clause is clearly separated in
kind from the more familiar "wrongful use of force and fear" clause,
but, unlike the disjunctive clauses in other crimes' definitions, it is
neither graced with language of an independent intent, nor part of a
list included under a broader intent. Nonetheless, color-of-right ex-
tortion is a common law crime listed by the Field Code as a crime
against property, and as such its prosecution should require a "spe-
cific" state of mind. The inclusion of color-of-right extortion amongst
other property crimes hints at that which the Field Code does not
mention-that color-of-right extortion carries the "specific" state of
mind "corruptly."
B. Corruption, Bribery, and Extortion: Definition and Comparison
within the Field Code
The Field Code, like Title 18 of the United States Code, facially
retains a corrupt state of mind requirement for bribery, but not for
extortion. Unlike the federal code, the Field Code has a working defi-
nition of "corruptly." The Field Code adequately (if somewhat nar-
rowly) defines "corruptly" as "import[ing] a wrongful design to
acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person
168 Id. § 584 (emphasis added).
169 Id. § 553 (emphasis added).
170 Id. § 620.
171 Id. § 613 (emphasis added); cf 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2000) (using the Field
Code language to define extortion under color of official right).
172 Field Code, supra note 20, § 584 cmt. (emphasis added).
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guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person."' 173
The Field Code rightly states that the heart of the corrupt state of
mind is a "wrongful design." Further, it is the design-that is, pur-
pose-that is wrongful, not the mere conduct of acquisition.
Functionally, the structure of the Hobbs Act suggests that color-
of-right extortion should carry a heightened state of mind element.
Federal bribery, which can arise from the same conduct as color-of-
right extortion and itself carries a corrupt state of mind requirement,
carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years. 174 Color-of-right extortion
under the Hobbs Act, which on its face has no state of mind element,
carries a maximum penalty of twenty years.1 75 It is a well-recognized
principle of the criminal law that separate crimes covering similar con-
duct generally punish the more evil-meaning mind (that is, one with a
more specific purpose to commit a wrong) with the greater sen-
tence.176 It makes little sense for two federal statutes covering much
of the same conduct to carry substantially different penalties when the
more harshly punished conduct requires the lesser state of mind. The solution
to this apparent structural flaw is to read a corrupt state of mind re-
quirement into color-of-right extortion, as at common law.
C. People v. Whaley
The Field Code's only cited case regarding color-of-right extor-
tion is People v. VVhaley. 177 Further, the Supreme Court relied upon
Mhaley as precedent in both Evans 78 and McCormick.179 The Field
Code's omission of an express corrupt state of mind element is inter-
esting in light of its use of Mhaley as a source, given that Mhaley ex-
pressly included ajury finding of corrupt state of mind as an essential
173 Id. § 765.
174 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (4) (2000).
175 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
176 Punishment for the taking of human life, for example, may vary widely. "Mur-
derers," or those who take life deliberately without excuse or justification, are pun-
ished more severely than "manslaughterers," those who commit the same conduct
with a lesser degree of intent. This example typifies the criminal law.
177 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
178 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 276 (1992) (using Whaley to rebutJustice
Scalia's dissenting claim (which itself relied on Wha/ey) that color-of-right extortion at
common law always involved false pretenses).
179 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 279 (1991) (citing Whaey as the sole
pre-Hobbs Act New York prosecution of color of right extortion, in an attempt to
demonstrate the dearth of authority for the crime's definition). As Part I demon-
strates, however, ample authority for the definition of color of right extortion exists if
research is extended but a little further back in time.
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element of the charge.18 0 The jury sitting in Whaley found guilt by
concluding that the defendant judge "received and demanded . ..
money by color of his office, and with the corrupt intent charged in the
indictment.'8 1 The opinion stated that "[t]hese facts being proved, the
[offense] was complete."' 82 In contrast to the Field Code and the Su-
preme Court jurisprudence that draw upon Whaley as precedent, the
Whaley itself included "corruptly" as an essential element to the
charge of extortion under color-of-right.
Furthermore, Whaley held that "[t] he questions of fact and [cor-
rupt] intent were fairly submitted to the jury. It was their province to
judge of both .... ,183 As corrupt intent was a question of fact for the
jury, Whaley strongly suggests that mistake of law was a defense to the
element of corrupt state of mind. If mistake of the law is a defense to
color-of-right extortion, then knowledge of the law must be an ele-
ment of the corrupt state of mind. Uhaley's holding has the addi-
tional benefit of being correct in light of the common-law tradition.
The Hobbs Act drew its language and meaning from the Field
Code. The Field Code was a codification of the common law. Whaley,
the common-law opinion referenced by the Field Code, recognized
the longstanding common-law tradition of requiring a corrupt state of
mind for guilt, and therefore admitting a possible mistake of law de-
fense in color-of-right extortion cases. Accordingly, courts should re-
quire that color-of-right extortion under the Hobbs Act be committed
''corruptly."
IV. ALFISI AND ROMA: A CASE STUDY IN THE CONFUSION
OF THE MODERN COURTS
Recently, federal courts and reform bodies have struggled with
various stopgap measures designed to mitigate the potential reach of
the bribery and extortion statutes. One prominent discussion, ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in McCormick v. United States,184 settled
in the affirmative a judicial debate over whether the Hobbs Act in-
cluded a quid pro quo requirement for color-of-right extortion. The
quid pro quo requirement, however, serves as a pained and ill-fitting
180 Whaley, 6 Cow. at 664.
181 Id. (emphasis added).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 500 U.S. 527 (1991) (asserting that color-of-right extortion could not be found
absent a finding of quid pro quo).
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effort by the Court to recover the utility of a properly defined corrupt
state of mind requirement. 18 5
Another band-aid, this one applied to bribery by the American
Law Institute (ALI), is found in the Model Penal Code's recommenda-
tion (adopted in several states) 186 that the "corruptly" language be re-
moved from bribery statutes altogether because "the requirement of
'corrupt' purpose provides virtually no guidance as to the intended
scope of the law of bribery."' 8 7 Despite the ALI's argument to the
contrary, purging the law of "corruptly" has resulted not in greater
clarity, but rather in deeper confusion.1 8
A case contrast between proper and improper conceptions of cor-
rupt state of mind as it relates to extortion and bribery will serve as a
useful to guide to inform a broader survey of the federal courts. In
Roma Construction Co. v. aRusso,189 the First Circuit correctly captured
the proper role of corrupt state of mind. In Roma, Peter Zanni and
Roma Construction Company entered into a real estate development
venture. 91° Unbeknownst to them, their partners in the venture had
made a deal with the "de facto government of the Town" in which
cash would be exchanged for necessary approvals. 91 Eventually, the
partners departed and Roma and Zanni were informed of the preex-
isting deal and asked to pay up. 192 Faced with a choice between capit-
ulating to the extortionate demand or losing their multimillion dollar
investment, Roma and Zanni decided to pay. 193 Three years later, af-
ter Zanni succeeded in selling his shares of the venture, he contacted
185 See infra Part V.A.
186 The Model Penal Code lists Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virgina as following their 'corruptless' approach. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1
cmt. n.10 (1980).
187 Id. § 240.1 cmt.
188 This Note contends that Roma Construction v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566 (lst Cir.
1996) is a solid example of a well-decided case in this area. Roma was decided Linder
Rhode Island state law, which had not adopted the Model Penal Code formulation of
bribery. Under the Model Penal Code scheme, Roma would have been decided differ-
ently and wrongly. By contrast, United Stales v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002), is a
good example of the problems that inevitably result from omitting a corrupt state of
mind requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 201-14.
189 96 F.3d at 566.





the FBI and cooperated with the resulting investigation.194 Zanni and
Roma later brought a civil claim against the "de facto government"
that included a count under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).195
The district court concluded that Roma and Zanni could not
bring a RICO claim because they were not "innocent victims," that is,
their capitulation to the extortion was itself illegal behavior-namely
bribery. 19 6 The First Circuit condemned the district court's reliance
on the Model Penal Code analysis of bribery, claiming that the ALI
view "represents a shift from the common law in expanding the scope
of bribery sanctions for payors to situations in which the payor does
not act corruptly."'1 97 The court continued "[t]he mens rea implicated
by 'corruptly' concerns the intention to obtain ill-gotten gain; by con-
trast, the Model Penal Code converts the lack of willpower to stand up
to abusive authority into a degree of culpability."' 98 The court al-
lowed Roma and Zanni to continue with their RICO claim because
they "were in fact victims of coercive extortion, and ... have not pled
guilty to a crime that involves 'corrupt intent' as an element."1 99 Tell-
ingly, the court commented that "' [t]he best thing that can be said for
[the Model Penal Code's conception of bribery] is that it makes diffi-
cult questions of crime definition easy, but this clarity is bought at the
cost of ignoring the settled law of centuries and current notions of
right and wrong.' "201
Roma demonstrates that, because bribery and extortion are
crimes that cover the same conduct, a well-defined corrupt state of
mind requirement is necessary to protect the victims of color-of-right
extortion from charges of bribery.
194 Id.
195 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000) [hereinafter RICO]. In this case, the
predicate acts for the RICO count were state extortion provisions under Rhode Island
law. See Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 906 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (D.R.I. 1995).
196 Roma, 906 F. Supp. at 78, 81-82. The court analyzes the "innocent victim"
element under Rhode Island's bribery law, which is substantially similar to federal
bribery under § 201(b). Id. Compare R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-7-4(a) (1953) ("No person
shall corruptly give ... any gift or valuable consideration to ... any public official as
an inducement or reward for doing or forebearing to do... any act in relation to the
business of... the state, city or town of which he or she is an official."), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 201 (b) (punishing "[w] hoever... corruptly gives... anything of value to any public
official ... with intent ... to influence any official act").
197 Roma, 96 F.3d at 573.
198 Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
199 Id.
200 Id. (quoting Lindgren, supra note 15, at 824 n.41).
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In contrast to the First Circuit's ruling in Roma, the Second Cir-
cuit found that victims of color-of-right extortion could be charged as
bribegivers in United States v. Alfisi.21' In Alfisi, Mark Alfisi was
charged with bribery and payment of an illegal gratuity.212 The
charges were predicated upon a series of payments made by Alfisi to
William Cashin, a USDA Marketing Agricultural Service inspector.203
According to the court, a "routine" practice at Hunt's Point Market
(where Alfisi and Cashin conducted business) was to bribe a USDA
inspector to alter his report of produce shipment's quality in such a
way as to allow the bribegiver to renegotiate advantageously the con-
tract price for the shipment.2°14 Alfisi argued that he did not pay
Cashin to secure an unfair benefit; rather, given the routine (and
hence, expected) nature of the kickback, he paid only to induce
Cashin to perform his job faithfully.211 5 In effect, Alfisi argued that
Cashin was extorting the payments in return for proper performance
of his official duties.
The court responded to Alfisi's argument in a remarkable fash-
ion. It contended that, even if Alfisi were an extortion victim only
paying Cashin to perform his lawful duty, Alfisi would nevertheless be
guilty of the bribery charges. Relying on United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers,206 the court maintained, "a defendant may be properly con-
victed for paying bribes to a public official for any kind of quid pro quo
exchange.'211 7 The court thus reduced "corruptly" from a meaningful
state of mind element to a mere aid for distinguishing between a bribe
and an illegal gratuity.208
The court contended that a corrupt state of mind element is un-
necessary to avoid problems of over- and underbreadth. It main-
tained that the risk of overbreadth is "minimalized . . . by the
existence of the economic coercion defense."2119 The court balked at
the prospect of requiring proof of unlawful intent; it feared that "if
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt actual or in-
tended violations of official duties, many highly culpable payments
201 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
202 Id. at 146 (stating that Alfisi was charged under both 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1) (A)
(2000) (bribery of a public official) and 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1)(A) (giving an illegal
gratuity to a public official)).
203 Id. at 147.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 526 U.S. 398 (1998).
207 Alfisi, 308 F.3d at 150 n.1 (first emphasis added).
208 Id. at 151 n.2.
209 Id. at 151.
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would go underpunished as unlawful gratuities, or unpunished alto-
gether."21 The court proved too much-its phobia of making culpa-
bility an element of the crime rather than an issue of judicial
discretion has no place in a free society operating on a presumption
of innocence.
The court's majority opinion is countered successfully by Judge
Sack's dissent. Judge Sack argued, "the nature of the quid pro quo the
payor is looking for matters."2 11 Sack contended that "to act corruptly
is to act with the specific intent to secure an unlawful advantage or
benefit."212 Sack commented insightfully on the majority's interpreta-
tion of Sun-Diamond Growers, noting that
[A] ttributing the quid pro quo element to the word "corruptly" does
not avoid the surplusage because the words of the statute indicate
that the quid pro quo element is established not by the term "cor-
ruptly," but rather by other terms, i.e., a payment "with intent.., to
influence an official act."213
Sack contended, "Sun-Diamond... holds what plain meaning suggests:
The quid pro quo element arises not from the term 'corruptly,' but
rather from the term 'to influence."' 2 14
The lesson of Roma and Alfisi is apparent. The Roma court, by
requiring a corrupt state of mind, could distinguish between licit and
illicit behavior without significant difficulty, could maintain a defini-
tion of corruption that is neither over- nor underbroad, and could
limit the borders of a potentially limitless extortion statute. The Alfisi
court, by effectively reading the corrupt state of mind requirement
out of the bribery statute, left itself helpless in the face of these
problems.
V. A SURVEY OF THE MODERN COURTS
A. The Supreme Court
Most courts operate with neither the insightfulness of the Roma
court nor the blindness of the Alfisi court, but rather fall somewhere
in between. The Supreme Court's .jurisprudence regarding extortion
is confused in many respects. Since the passage of the Hobbs Act, the
Court has struggled with the breadth of the Act's coverage, particu-
210 Id.
211 Id. at 154 (Sack, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (Sack, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
213 Id. at 156 (SackJ., dissenting).
214 Id. at :157 (Sack, J., dissenting).
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larly in the areas of organized labor215 and, more relevant to this
Note, color-of-right extortion.216
The Court's confusion regarding color-of-right extortion-partic-
ularly in the context of campaign finance-is understandable. The
Hobbs Act, on its face, could criminalize substantial amounts of com-
mon campaign finance activity; yet reforming the campaign finance
system by arresting politicians for the receipt of private funds was not
the Act's purpose, or even within its feasible charter.217 Nevertheless,
the Court recognized that some campaign finance activity is culpable
under extortion or bribery in the three cases that best define the
Court's jurisprudence regarding color-of-right extortion: McCormick v.
United States,218 Evans v. United States,219 and United States v. Sun-Dia-
mond Growers.220
In McCormick, Robert L. McCormick, a former member of the
West Virginia House of Delegates, appealed his conviction under the
Hobbs Act.22' The background of McCormick's conviction, while
unique in its details, describes a fairly commonplace situation for an
elected politician, that is, a context of closely interacting personal and
constituent interests.
In the early 1980s, West Virginia "had long suffered" from a
shortage of licensed medical doctors.222 In response, the state devel-
oped a program that allowed graduates of foreign medical schools to
obtain temporary licenses to practice while they studied for state li-
censing exams.223 Although some temporary license holders repeat-
edly failed the state licensing exams, the state allowed them to retain
the privilege to practice. 224 The House of Delegates debated ending
the temporary licensing program, and in response several of the tem-
porary license holders formed a political interest group and hired a
lobbyist.22 5 The lobbyist contacted McCormick, who successfully
sponsored a bill that extended the life of the temporary licensing pro-
gram.22 6 McCormick then agreed to sponsor legislation that would
215 See supra Part III.
216 See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); see also Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255 (1991).
217 See supra Part III.
218 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
219 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
220 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
221 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 261, 266-67.
222 Id. at 259.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 259-60.
226 Id. at 260.
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grant a permanent license without testing temporary license holders
who had sufficient experience. 227
In 1984, McCormick successfully ran for reelection. 228 During
the campaign (after he had extended the life of the temporary permit
program but before he had an opportunity to propose the permanent
license legislation), McCormick told the doctors' lobbyist that "his
campaign was expensive, that he had paid considerable sums out of
his own pocket, and that he had not heard anything from the foreign
doctors."2 29 The lobbyist contacted the doctors, and returned to Mc-
Cormick with two envelopes containing a total of $2900 in cash. 230
McCormick twice more received cash payments from the doctors, but
he did not list any of these payments as campaign contributions, nor
did he report the money as income in his tax return. 231 McCormick
was investigated and subsequently charged with five counts of Hobbs
Act extortion under color of official right.23 2
The Supreme Court overturned McCormick's conviction because
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals "affirmed McCormick's convic-
tion on legal and factual theories never tried before the jury."23 3 The
Court first considered the sufficiency of the jury instructions, conclud-
ing that "the Court of Appeals [failed to] note that the jury was not
instructed in accordance with the court's holding that the difference
between legitimate and illegitimate campaign contributions was to be
determined by the intention of the parties after considering specified
factors." 234
The Court considered McCormick's claim that the payments
made by the doctors "were campaign contributions, the receipt of
which did not violate the Hobbs Act."23 5 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court disapproved of a seven-part test used by the courts below to
differentiate legitimate from illegitimate contributions. The factors of
that test were
(1) whether the money was recorded by the payor as a campaign
contribution, (2) whether the money was recorded and reported by
the official as a campaign contribution, (3) whether the payment






232 Id. at 261.
233 Id. at 270 n.8.
234 Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
235 Id. at 268.
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to his campaign, (5) whether the official acted in his official capac-
ity at or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or
supported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the
official had supported similar legislation before the time of the pay-
ment, and (7) whether the official had directly or indirectly solic-
ited the payor individually for the payment. 23 6
The Court rightly noted that the seven-part test used by the court be-
low was not an adequate determinate of whether or not funds were
extorted or contributed, because even if "the result of each of these
seven inquiries was unfavorable to McCormick . . .we cannot agree
that a violation of the Hobbs Act would be made out. '23 7 Instead, the
Court held that the proper test for color-of-right extortion would be
the finding of a quid pro quo, that is, "if the payments are made in
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to per-
form or not perform an official act." 2 18 The Court asserted that
"[t]his formulation defines the forbidden zone of conduct with suffi-
cient clarity,"2 9 and further, that
[t]o hold otherwise would open to prosecution conduct that has
long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in
a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are
financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have
been from the beginning of the Nation.240
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia proposed an idiosyncratic
reading of extortion at common law. After discussing some of the
history of the Hobbs Act, Justice Scalia disparaged the majority's
"questionable" assumption that "under color of official right means
on account of one's office." 4 1 Justice Scalia proposed that a more
historically accurate reading of color-of-right extortion "more natu-
rally connotes some false assertion of official entitlement to the prop-
erty."2 42 Justice Scalia's position has merit insofar as it recognizes that,
historically, public officials had to know that they were not entitled to
that which they took. Insofar as he contends that color-of-right extor-
tion necessarily entails fraud, however, Justice Scalia misapprehends
the law. This will be discussed at length later.2 43
236 McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S.
257 (1991).
237 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.
238 Id. at 273.
239 Id. at 272.
240 Id. at 273.
241 Id. at 278 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
242 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
243 See infra text accompanying notes 283-300.
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McCormick admirably demonstrates the confusion under which
the Court labors regarding color-of-right extortion. The Court faced
a difficult dilemma: it not only had to adjudicate with some clarity the
thin and wavering line that separates legitimate campaign contribu-
tions from extorted payoffs, it had to do so without creating excessive
overbreadth or underbreadth in the Hobbs Act. A plain reading of
the statute would have resulted in its potential application to "conduct
that has long been thought to be well within the law," and even adher-
ing to the Fourth Circuit's seven-part test would have extended the
statute to apply to lawful conduct.244 Neither was the Court free to
exempt transactions in the political realm from the Hobbs Act, be-
cause the color of official right provision in § 1951 (b) (2) cannot be
reasonably read not to apply to such conduct. By establishing a quid
pro quo requirement, the Court attempted to limit the breadth of
color-of-right extortion to an appropriate scope while defining "the
forbidden zone of conduct with sufficient clarity."24 5
While the quid pro quo requirement adequately addresses the
problems of breadth and differentiation directly presented by McCor-
mick, it fails to fix either problem generally. Regarding breadth, the
quid pro quo requirement shares the same flaw as the seven-part test
that it replaced: both standards criminalize otherwise accepted and
lawful conduct. At the same time, a defendant could fail every aspect
of the Fourth Circuit's seven-part test and yet not be guilty of color-of-
right extortion.246 The quid pro quo standard narrows, but does not
solve, the overbreadth problem. Indeed, as Justice Stevens noted in
dissent, "quid pro quo tends to confuse the analysis." 247
Overbreadth and underbreadth remain a problem under the
quid pro quo standard. The requirement increases the difficulty of
proving a charge of Hobbs Act extortion against public officials in-
volved in the normal rough-and-tumble of campaign finance, but it
still includes some of those activities within the line of statutory pro-
scription, especially in light of the Court's reluctance to allow the re-
quirement to be circumvented by "winks and nods." 248 In the
complex negotiations and exchanges of campaign finance, the term
"quid pro quo" will likely prove unhelpful to a politician seeking to
avoid illegality. First, all campaign donees expect or hope that the
public official to whom they donate will act in their interest in re-
244 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.
245 Id. at 273.
246 Id. at 272.
247 Id. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
248 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 275 (1992); see also United States v. Car-
penter, 961 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1992).
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sponse to the donation. To that extent, all donees act with some in-
tent to influence. Second, all politicians accept donations with some
intent to be influenced. To attract donations, public officials must
promise to act in certain ways for their donees. Officials often phrase
promises as assurances that they will remain open to an idea, or will
remain favorably disposed towards some area of legislation, or even
will choose staff members with the donee's interests in mind. None of
these promises are illegal or even irregular, but, if made in direct con-
nection with a donation, they all technically meet the quid pro quo
standard as "situations [wherein] the official asserts that his official
conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertak-
ing, ' 2411 particularly in light of the "winks and nods" gloss.
Another example of acceptable behavior criminalized under the
quid pro quo standard is logrolling. Politicians, as a regular part of
their occupation, agree to trade support. Generally, officials will "sell"
votes on issues not directly relevant to their constituencies in return
for similar votes from other officials on issues that do. 250 For exam-
ple, a senator from Indiana might agree to vote for a bill authorizing
the construction of more coastal lighthouses if a senator from Maine
agrees to vote favorably for corn subsidies. Although surely distasteful
to some observers, this behavior is necessary grease for a legislative
body whose members represent diverse and frequently non-overlap-
ping interests. Logrolling quite literally falls within the quid pro quo
proscription: each official is making an explicit promise that his offi-
cial conduct will be influenced in return for the other's favor.
Furthermore, the quid pro quo standard adds a problem of un-
derbreadth not found in the Fourth Circuit test because it requires
that the public official perform some act in return for the illicit pay-
ment. AsJustice Stevens noted in dissent, "[s]ubtle extortion isjust as
wrongful-and probably much more common-than the kind of ex-
press understanding that the Court's opinion seems to require. 25' In
common practice, public officials can extort without explicitly promis-
ing benefit or threatening harm; the threat of harm, if any, may be the
unstated power inherent in the office itself. Under the quid pro quo
standard, the conduct of public officials who make bald requests for
funds unaccompanied by explicit promises or threats (even though an
implicit threat exists by virtue of the office) falls outside of the pro-
scriptions of the Hobbs Act.
249 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273.
250 See Philip P. Fricky & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process,
and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 1I YALE L.J. 1707, 1712 (2002).
251 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A better method of achieving the delicate balance towards which
the Court strives does exist. Rather, this method existed at common
law, and has been largely overlooked by the modern law. The corrupt
state of mind element as found in the common law functioned to re-
solve precisely the questions of breadth and differentiation that
plagued the McCormick Court. A corrupt state of mind requirement
solves the problem of breadth by making knowledge of wrongdoing
part of the definition of the crime. Public officials conducting the
normal gray affairs of campaigning are safe from conviction so long as
they avoid accepting contributions that they know to be illegal. The
courts also benefit from a flexible and adroit standard capable of ade-
quately differentiating between licit and illicit behavior in a wide vari-
ety of situations.
Much of the utility of corrupt state of mind as a standard is that it
is an element of intent. As such, it naturally requires circumstantial
evidence for its proof.2 5 2 In a corrupt state of mind analysis, all the
factors of the Fourth Circuit's seven-part test would be relevant not to
prove that the defendant committed extortion, but to prove that he
acted corruptly. The court would have to further determine that the
conduct was itself illicit to convict. This extra layer of analysis narrows
the scope of the Hobbs Act more precisely than the quid pro quo
requirement. Corrupt state of mind analysis mitigates the over-
breadth problem by limiting the statute to persons who know that
they are misusing their office. For example, logrolling, which falls
squarely within the quid pro quo standard, is rightfully viewed as law-
ful conduct under a corrupt state of mind analysis. The required find-
ing of a corrupt mind also significantly mitigates the underbreadth
problem by allowing the statute to reach persons who extort without
making explicit threats or promises, if the circumstantial evidence
demonstrates an unlawful intent.
A corrupt state of mind requirement also helps courts to differen-
tiate more adeptly between legitimate and illegitimate behavior. By
criminalizing behavior that an official knew was unlawful, and recog-
nizing such knowledge (shown by circumstantial evidence such as re-
questing cash payments or improper tax reporting) as an element of
the crime, the corrupt intent element steers courts towards bona fide
extortions and away from legitimate but questionable behavior. For
example, under a corrupt state of mind analysis, the Court would have
probably upheld McCormick's conviction because the available evi-
dence demonstrated that he understood the illegality of his conduct.
By concentrating on the actual intent of the official, the Court can
252 See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 706-08.
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more discerningly evaluate questionable conduct. This is not to say
that all receipts of value that an official believes are unlawful consti-
tute extortion; rather, such a belief can serve as a helpful guide for
courts that must make bright-line differentiations in unclear areas of
conduct.
In Evans v. United States,253 the Supreme Court defined color-of-
right extortion under the Hobbs Act as an offense derived from the
common law.2 54 The issue considered by the Evans Court was
"whether an affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as
a demand, is an element of extortion under color of official right pro-
hibited by the Hobbs Act. '255 The defendant, John Evans, was an
elected public official serving on the Board of Commissioners of
DeKalb County, Georgia. 2r56 As part of a federal investigation into
public corruption in the Atlanta, an FBI special agent initiated a series
of conversations (almost all of which were taped or recorded) in
which he sought Evans's help in rezoning a twenty-five acre tract of
land.2 57 The agent provided Evans with cash totaling $7000 and a
$1000 check written to his campaign. 258 Evans reported the check as
a campaign donation, but did not report the cash as a campaign dona-
tion or as income for tax purposes. 259 At trial, the jury found that
Evans accepted the cash "knowing that it was intended to ensure that
he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and that he would
try to persuade his fellow commissioners to do likewise." 260 The trial
court instructed the jury that "if [Evans] demands or accepts money in
exchange for [a] specific requested exercise of his or her official
power, such a demand or acceptance does constitute a violation of the
Hobbs Act regardless of whether the payment was made in the form of
a campaign contribution. '" 2 11 In affirming the conviction, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the inducement requirement "is automatically
satisfied by the power connected with the public office." 262
The Supreme Court affirmed Evans's conviction by insisting that,
consistent with color-of-right extortion at common law, quid pro quo
253 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
254 d. at 259.
255 Id. at 256 (quotations omitted).





261 Id. at 258.
262 Id. at 258 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
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does not require the public official to have induced payment.2 3
Rather, the Court maintained, "although [Evans] did not initiate the
transaction, his acceptance of the bribe constituted an implicit prom-
ise to use his official position to serve the interests of the
bribegiver. '' 26 4 This holding, insofar as it suggests that the quid pro
quo need not be express, exists in tension with McCormick's contrary
holding.
Although the tension between the holdings in Evans and McCor-
mick suggests that the quid pro quo standard is functionally inade-
quate, Evans's primary significance for the purposes of this Note is
that in both the majority and dissenting opinions the Court insists that
Congress deliberately enacted common-law extortion by passing the
Hobbs Act.2 65 Further, the Court uses the common law to clarify
whether or not color-of-right extortion contains an inducement ele-
ment.2 66 Recognizing that Hobbs Act extortion is an offense funda-
mentally defined by the common law allowed the Court to
acknowledge that the official did not have to induce the payment to
commit a culpable act-he needed only to receive it.267 While the
Court did use the common-law "no inducement" gloss to repair some
of the breadth problems that it created with the quid pro quo test, it
created two additional problems. First, the Court failed to realize that
a "no inducement" gloss on culpable conduct only makes sense in
light of an additional corrupt state of mind requirement. Second, by
allowing implicit quid pro quo exchanges to count, the Evans Court
created significant tension with the previous year's holding in
McCormick.
The Court emphasized the Hobbs Act's common-law origin by
reiterating the holding from Taylor v. United States:268 "'a statutory
term is generally presumed to have its common law meaning."269
The Court also read the Hobbs Act in light of the teaching of Morris-
ette v. United States.270
[W] here Congress borrows terms of art which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
263 Id. at 255-56.
264 i. at 257.
265 Id. at 255; see also id. at 279 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266 The Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to interpreting the Hobbs Act
in light of common-law extortion in Scheidler v. Nalt Org. for Women 537 U.S. 393
(2003).
267 Evans, 504 U.S. at 259-60.
268 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
269 Evans, 504 U.S. at 259 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592).
270 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be
taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a depar-
ture from them. 27 1
The Court, after reviewing the various opinions of the circuits, con-
cluded that "the majority view is consistent with the common-law defi-
nition of extortion, which we believe Congress intended to adopt,
[and] we endorse that position." 272
After establishing that Congress enacted common-law extortion,
the Court attempted to define common-law extortion:
At common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public
official who took "by colour of his office" money that was not due to
him for the performance of his official duties. A demand, or re-
quest, by the public official was not an element of the offense. Ex-
tortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we
would now describe as "taking a bribe."2 73
This definition, while technically correct, is remarkably unhelpful. As
this Note shows, a deeper look at common-law history yields a more
detailed and helpful definition. 2 74
The other issue of significance addressed by the Evans Court was
whether the Hobbs Act had modified common-law extortion. The
Court recognized that the Hobbs Act was modeled on the Field
Code,275 which itself directly adopted common-law extortion.2 76 The
Court determined that Congress had not significantly changed the
common-law definition of extortion, since "[t] here was nothing in ei-
ther the statutory text or the legislative history that could fairly be
described as a 'contrary direction.' ,,27 7 Most important, the Court ac-
knowledged the significance of "common law history to guide our in-
terpretation of the statutory text" when considering color-of-right
extortion in the Hobbs Act.27" Furthermore, the Court explicitly
stated that, at common law, "extortion was defined as the corrupt tak-
271 Evans, 504 U.S. at 259-60 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263).
272 Id. at 259.
273 1(. at 260.
274 See supra Part 1.
275 See supra Part 1Il; see also Field Code, supra note 20, § 613.
276 Evans, 504 U.S. at 261 n.9; see supra Part III.A.
277 Id. at 264 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263).
278 Id. at 265.
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ing or receipt of an unlawful fee by a public officer under color of
office."
2 7 9
The Evans Court invoked the common law to address the under-
breadth problem created by McCormick's quid pro quo standard. In so
doing, the Evans Court nevertheless failed to address the problems of
overbreadth and differentiation also created by quid pro quo.280 Fur-
thermore, the Evans Court (like most modern courts) ignored the full
import of an extortion statute informed by the common law. Al-
though the Court recognized that the common law defined color-of-
right extortion as a corrupt taking, it treated corrupt intent as surplus-
age empty of content and unworthy of comment. Nevertheless, the
Court's holding that official right extortion has no inducement re-
quirement only makes sense in light of a corrupt intent element.
Without an element of unlawful intent, color-of-right extortion under
Evans is essentially a strict liability crime. The "no inducement" hold-
ing, in light of quid pro quo holding in McCormick, makes the predi-
cate conduct intentless: since the official need not have induced the
payment, the official need only know that he was accepting any pay-
ment at all. Under Evans, a politician could conceivably spend twenty
years in prison because he was mistaken about the legality of what he
believed to be an innocent campaign contribution.
In both Evans and McCormick, Justice Scalia disagreed with the
majority's conception of color-of-right extortion at common law. In
McCormick, Justice Scalia contended that the color-of-right language
"connote[d] some false assertion of official entitlement to the prop-
erty."281 Later, in Evans, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in which Jus-
tice Scaliajoined.28 2 Following the line of thought Scalia established
in McCormick, Thomas's dissent argued that the
color of office element of extortion . . .had a definite and well-
established meaning at common law. "At common law it was essen-
tial that the money or property be obtained under color of office,
that is, under the pretense that the officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his
office. The money or thing received must have been claimed or ac-
cepted in right of office, and the person paying must have yielded
to official authority. 28 3
Thomas maintained, "[a] survey of 19th and early 20th century cases
construing state extortion statutes in light of the common law makes
279 Id. at 265 n.14 (emphasis added).
280 Id. at 265.
281 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 278 (1991) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
282 Evans, 504 U.S. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 279 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHAR-
TON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1393, at 790 (1957)).
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plain that the offense was understood to involve not merely a wrong-
ful taking by a public official, but a wrongful taking under a false pre-
tense of official right."284
Justice Thomas's historical analysis rightly recognizes that color-
of-right extortion at common law involved an element of knowledge
that the fee taken for official action was inappropriate. Indeed, the
social and economic context of medieval England practically required
laws governing extortion to some special state of mind element, be-
cause all officials legally accepted private fees for official action. 28 5
Justice Thomas, however, concluded that this special state of mind
element was not "corruptly," but rather intent to defraud. He reached
this conclusion by examining early American case law, virtually all of
which was decided after the corrupt state of mind requirement be-
came "lost."28 6 Ironically, to support his theory of color-of-right extor-
tion-as-fraud, justice Thomas cited authority that rightly recognizes a
corrupt state of mind:
Our extortion statute, which had its origin at least as early as 1796,
appears on its face to have been originally intended to be reiterative
of the common law. The essence of that offense was the receiving
or taking by any public officer, by color of his office, of any fee or
reward not allowed by law for performing his duties. The purpose
would seem to be simply to penalize the officer who non-innocently in-
sisted upon a larger fee than he was entitled to or a fee where none was
permitted or required to be paid for the performance of an obligatry function
of his office. The matter was obviously of particular importance in
the days when public officials received their compensation through
fees collected and not by a fixed salary. 287
Justices Scalia and Thomas misinterpreted the common law as
saying that color-of-right extortion always involved pretense or fraud.
While color-of-right extortion certainly could involve pretense or
fraud, these are not necessary elements of the crime. This can be eas-
ily shown by review of a few of the cases that support this Note's histor-
ical analysis. 288 Rex v. Seymour and Others,28s9 Rex v. Young & Pilts,290
and Rex v. William 291 are three examples of common law color-of-
284 Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
285 See supra Part L.A-B.
286 See supra note 20.
287 Evans, 504 U.S. at 284 n.4 (Thomas, j., dissenting) (quoting State v. Begyn, 167
A.2d 161, 166-67 (N.J. 1967)) (citations omitted).
288 See supra Part I.
289 87 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1740).
290 97 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1758).
291 97 Eng. Rep. 851 (K.B. 1762).
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right extortions without pretense or fraud-these cases involved bald
unlawful demands. Furthermore, as Rex v. Wadsworth,29 2 Rex v. Rob-
erts,293 and Lake's Casd294 all demonstrate, the class of possible offend-
ers in common-law extortion extended beyond public officials to
civilians (such as millers or ferrymen) who were subject to customary
fee limitations. If civilians that collected customary dues could be
prosecuted for color-of-right extortion, and the customary fees were a
matter of common knowledge, the offense could not have always re-
quired pretense or fraud, because deception in that context would
have been improbable bordering on impossible. Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas's conception of common-law extortion is, however,
understandable. The Justices drew mainly from sources that were
written after corrupt intent became "lost" in the late eighteenth cen-
tury.2 95 Some of the cases cited by these sources, such as People v.
Whaley, nevertheless essentially retained a corrupt state of mind re-
quirement without using the word "corruptly."29 6 Other sources, such
as the Field Code, did not.
The Justices' position seems to rely upon commentary found in
the Field Code.29 7 In a footnote to a section on obtaining property by
false pretenses under the crime of false personation, the Code ex-
plains that, in that specific section, it forewent the use of the phrase
"'by color of' ... in order that it may be clear that [false personation]
cases are embraced in which a false pretense is used in aid of the
fraud, but such pretense is not the controlling inducement operative
upon the mind of the party defrauded.""2 98 This commentary seems to
imply whatJustice Thomas claims-that the color-of-right language at
common law applied only to false pretenses. Unfortunately, Field
himself may have substantially overlooked the import of "corruptly" as
it related to color-of-right extortion; or at least failed to make it ex-
press. 299 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas consequently misinterpret
the message of the common law. A deeper reach into earlier com-
292 87 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1694).
293 87 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1693).
294 74 Eng. Rep. 677 (K.B. 1591).
295 In McCormick, Justice Scalia relies upon People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (NY. Sup.
Ct. 1827). McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 279 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). In Evans, Justice Thomas's dissent uses Collier v. State, 55 Ala. 125 (1867), and
Whaley to support the relevant points. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 281-82
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
296 See supra Part III.C.
297 See Field Code, supro note 20, § 623 cmt.
298 Id.
299 See supra Part III.
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mon-law history would have clarified their misapprehension.3 1 (l The
Justices' misapprehension, however, is less harmful than others that
the Court has relied upon in this field.
For example, in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,301 the Su-
preme Court emphasized the similarity in kind between bribery and
color-of-right extortion by equating the corrupt state of mind require-
ment on the face of the bribery statute with the quid pro quo standard
laid out in McCormick.30 2
The defendants, members of an agricultural interest group, were
charged with violating the gratuities statute for giving former Secre-
tary of Agriculture Michael Espy approximately $5900 in gifts.3 °3 The
defendants challenged the district court's jury instruction, which
"placed an expansive gloss" on 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) by "saying, among
other things, that 'I[i] t is sufficient if Sun-Diamond provided Espy with
unauthorized compensation simply because he held public office,'
and that '[t]he government need not prove that the alleged gratuity
was linked to a specific or identifiable official act or any act at all.' "304
To help explain its view of the law, the Supreme Court endeav-
ored to "place § 201(c) (1) (A) within the context of the statutory
scheme. '"3 0 5 The Court noted that the difference between the two
crimes subsisted primarily in their state of mind requirements:
"[b]ribery requires intent 'to influence' an official act.., while illegal
gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted 'for or
because of' an official act. In other words, for bribery there must be a
quid pro quo."'30 6 Although it construed illegal gratuities as a strict lia-
bility crime, the Court nevertheless maintained that even the gratui-
ties statute requires a nexus between the gift and some official act
beyond the possession of office itself.3°1 7 The difference between brib-
ery and an illegal gratuity, then, is an issue of degree rather than of
kind: where bribery requires a quid pro quo between the gift and a
specific act, an illegal gratuity needs only a connection to any act at all.
According to the Court, the benefit of this position is that it allows the
300 See supra Part I.
301 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
302 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
303 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 401.
304 Id. at 403.
305 Id. at 404.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 405-06.
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statute's definition of "official act"30° to control the bounds of the
statute.
The Court's equation of a corrupt state of mind requirement with
the finding of quid pro quo is not entirely dysfunctional, but it is in-
sufficient. First, reading "corruptly" as a specific intent to trade pecu-
niary value for an official act fails to protect either the possibly
extorted bribegiver or the possibly mistaken public official bribetaker
from the problems of breadth that plague color-of-right extortion.
Tellingly, the Court admits that conduct permissible under guidelines
established by the Office of Governmental Ethics could conceivably
still violate the illegal gratuities statute.30 9 Also, by comparing illegal
gratuities and bribery in terms of different degrees of quid pro quo,
the Court's interpretation demotes "corruptly," the express intent ele-
ment in the bribery statute, from an element of the crime to little
more than a glorified sentencing guideline.
B. The Circuits
The circuit courts that have considered color-of-right extortion
fall into two groups regarding corrupt intent The Second, Third,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals attempt to approximate a
corrupt intent element without using the "corruptly" language. The
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals expressly recognize
a corrupt state of mind requirement, but treat it as surplusage.
One commonality amongst the circuits that bears discussion is a
significant agreement (at least before the holding to the same effect
in United States v. Evans310) that bribery and extortion are not mutu-
ally exclusive, and that both crimes may stem from the same underly-
ing conduct.311 Because a corrupt state of mind requirement is on
the face of the federal bribery statute, 312 the agreement amongst the
circuits that the same predicate conduct can lead to Hobbs Act color-
of-right extortion strongly suggests that corrupt state of mind is an
implicit part of the extortion statute.
308 The statute defines official act as "[a]ny decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or
which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official ca-
pacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit." 18 U.S.C. § 201 (a)(3) (2000).
309 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 412.
310 United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
311 See United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Adcock, 558 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.
1976); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Hyde,
448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).
312 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1) ("whoever ... corruptly gives").
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1. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits
The Second Circuit addressed color-of-right Hobbs Act extortion
in United States v. Coyne.""' In Coyne, the court affirmed a conviction
for federal extortion and bribery.3 14 Coyne challenged the jury in-
struction given at trial. 15 The instruction required the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the defendant accepted or
solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his con-
duct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or
transaction .... "3 16 Coyne's objection was to the "in part" language in
the instruction, but the unchallenged portion of the instruction con-
stituted a finding of corrupt state of mind. The Second Circuit up-
held the instruction's propriety because it "satisfies the quid pro quo
requirement of McCormick. '3 17 The court failed to realize what this
Note argues: that instruction, by requiring a corrupt state of mind as
an element of the crime, provided a standard both truer to the com-
mon law and more useful than the quid pro quo standard. Coyne
shows that the Second Circuit defined color-of-right extortion in
terms of an unlawful intent, and that they were able to do so because,
in that case, the conduct also fell within the standard of quid pro quo.
When the Second Circuit faces a more marginal case, where a public
official's conduct includes a quid pro quo but does not include an
unlawful intent,""' the court's duty to comply with the quid pro quo
standard laid down by the Supreme Court will leave it vulnerable to
the problems of breadth and differentiation.
The Third Circuit similarly approximated corrupt intent in
United States v. Ceyilli.319 Cerilli involved questionable political finance
practices, but was decided before Evans or McCormick. Because the
case was decided before McCormick and Evans, the Third Circuit was
free from a precedential mandate to apply the quid pro quo standard.
313 4 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1993).
314 Id. at 113.
315 Id.
316 Id. (emphasis added).
317 Id. at 114.
318 The Second Circuit's approach is ill-equipped to deal with any case where a
public official accepts any thing of value with any connection to her official duty. For
example, accepting ajacket in return for participation in a charity golf event while in
office would constitute grounds for prosecution under this view. See, e.g., United
States v. McDade, 827 F.Supp. 1153, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing to dismiss counts
of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right and bribery directed at Congress-
man Joseph McDade, despite McDade's belief that he had acted in accordance with
the House Rules of Ethics).




The court affirmed the conviction on the grounds that Cerilli acted
with a corrupt state of mind, without explicitly using the "corruptly"
language. Cerilli, a Superintendent for the Pennsylvania Department
of Tranportation in Westmoreland County, was convicted of Hobbs
Act extortion for requiring extra payments from companies that
wished to compete for contracts to lease snow removal equipment.32t 1
Cerilli contended that these payments were political contributions
(some of the payments were in fact checks made out to political com-
mittees), and that these contributions could not be punished under
the Hobbs Act because they were not collected for an unlawful pur-
pose. 32 1 The court recognized that "[t]he receipt of money whether
by a political party, a charitable institution, or by an individual is gen-
erally not inherently wrongful. The wrong under the Hobbs Act is the man-
ner in which it is obtained. " 22 Determining that Cerilli and his
confederates obtained the money wrongfully, the court affirmed their
convictions. The key distinction made by the court was that the crime
was collecting the money with an unlawful purpose, not necessarily for
an unlawful purpose. This insistence that subjective intent mattered
was, in effect, a reinstatement of a corrupt intent requirement. The
only thing the court lacked was a literary vessel in which to encapsu-
late its meaning-"corruptly" would have served well. The Third Cir-
cuit, however, is now required to subordinate this insight to the quid
pro quo standard. In "middle of the road" cases this will make little
difference, but, as always, harder cases will expose the court to the
functional problems of breadth and differentiation that the corrupt
state of mind requirement aims to solve.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Taylor823 is a
model of how the quid pro quo problems of breadth and differentia-
tion can be avoided by requiring a corrupt state of mind. In Taylor,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction of a state legislator for ex-
tortion and bribery.324 At trial, the jury was instructed that "[t]here
need be no specific quid pro quo to establish extortion under color of
official right. . . . In other words, the essence of the offense is the
corrupt effort to obtain payment of the powers public office (sic)
.... 325 In light of the holdings in Evans and McCormick, the Fourth
Circuit was unable to approve this instruction, and held that the pros-
ecution had to prove only that "a public official has obtained a pay-
320 Id. at 418.
321 Id. (emphasis added).
322 Id. at 419-20 (emphasis added).
323 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1993).
324 Id. at 382.
325 Id. at 385.
2003] 1781
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ment to which he is not entitled, knowing that the payment was in
return for official acts."326 Evans and McCormick required the Fourth
Circuit to lose an effective instruction: by complying with the Supreme
Court's demand for a quid pro quo, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
entire instruction, the second part of which rightly required a corrupt
state of mind. Had the court been free to approve of the district
court's common-law-based instruction, it would have been able to af-
firm the conviction. Instead, the Fourth Circuit found itself helpless
in the face of the underbreadth created by the quid pro quo standard.
Because no explicit exchange had occurred, the corrupt behavior
could not be punished.
The Ninth Circuit addressed color-of-right extortion under the
Hobbs Act in United States v. Carpenter.327 California state senator Paul
Carpenter appealed his conviction of four counts of racketeering and
extortion. 28 At issue in the appeal was whether Carpenter's jury in-
struction, which stated, "there need be no specific quid pro quo to
establish extortion under color of official right" violated the McCor-
mick standard.3 29 The court held that such an instruction was imper-
missible, and that an explicit quid pro quo was required.3t)
The court acknowledged that a great deal of political corruption
does not occur in readily identifiable exchanges in open daylight. Ac-
cordingly, it construed McCormick's explicitness standard to apply to
situations beyond when "an official has explicitly stated that he will
exchange official action for a contribution. '"33 1 The court recognized
that, strictly applied, the express quid pro quo standard would "allow
officials to escape liability under the Hobbs Act with winks and nods,
even when the evidence as a whole proves that there has been a meet-
ing of the minds ... "332 All that the Ninth Circuit court required for
guilt was that the "quid pro quo be clear and unambiguous, leaving no
uncertainty about the terms of the bargain." 3 The court explained
that the "understanding need not be verbally explicit. The jury may
consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, including the con-
326 Id.
327 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1992).
328 1i. at 825.
329 Id. at 826 (citations omitted).
330 Id.
331 Id. at 827.
332 Id. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was portentous. The Supreme Court later
in the same year also abandoned McCormick's express quid pro quo requirement in
United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
333 Caipenter, 961 F.2d at 827.
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text in which a conversation took place, to determine if there was a
meeting of the minds on a quid pro quo. '334
Like the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit attempted to construe
the Hobbs Act in a manner that would help it to differentiate between
acceptable and corrupt political activity. The court explained that the
explicitness requirement "serves to distinguish between contributions
that are given or received with the 'anticipation' of official action and
contributions that are given or received in exchange for a 'promise' of
official action."3 35
Nevertheless, a quid pro quo requirement-even one glossed
with an additional explicitness requirement-is a blunt tool insuffi-
cient to the surgical task of separating licit from illicit political activity.
The language of the court, by its appeal to evidence of intent as rele-
vant to the explicitness requirement, suggests that it was attempting to
determine whether the public official intended to subvert his office by
accepting or demanding undue payment. As a matter of common
sense, such an inquiry into whether a public official was acting with
unlawful intent could proceed with greater efficiency and accuracy if
conducted directly, rather than indirectly through the use of a quid
pro quo determination.
2. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
The Fifth Circuit requires extortion to be committed corruptly.
Although the court does not apply the common law term of art "cor-
ruptly" to color-of-right extortion, it does define the elements of ex-
tortion in the same fashion as it defines the word "corruptly" for
federal bribery. More important, the Circuit's definition of "cor-
ruptly" equates with the word's meaning at common law.
In United States v. Tomblin,3 36 Darell A. Tomblin appealed multi-
ple convictions, the relevant of which were federal bribery and Hobbs
Act extortion.3 37 The acts that led to Tomblin's conviction revolved
around his efforts to develop financial prospects in Grenada and to
gain controlling interests in several savings and loan institutions..33 8
Tomblin convinced two Texas bankers to assist with bankrolling his
plans.339 Tomblin promised that he would use his political influence
with Nevada Senator Jacob Hecht to help the bankers bypass the Fed-
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995).
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eral Home Loan Bank Board so that they could legitimate their ques-
tionable takeover of Suburban Savings Association.3 40  Tomblin
agreed to use his political influence to arrange a meeting between the
bankers and the chairman of the Board in return for a $250,000 loan,
a $25,000 lobbying fee to a third party, and a $50,000 campaign con-
tribution to Hecht's campaign fund.34 1 Tomblin promised a $50,000
campaign contribution and a 10% share in the venture to Glen Maud-
lin, Hecht's administrative assistant and campaign treasurer. 3 42
Tomblin's request for the $250,000 loan was the source of his extor-
tion conviction, and his promises to Maudlin were the grounds for the
bribery conviction. 3 43
Affirming Tomblin's conviction for bribery, the court upheld the
district court's jury instructions by reasoning from McCormick and
Evans:
Under the bribery statutes, the government must prove a quid pro
quo, that is, that the official took money in return for an exercise of
official power. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 269-73. In
order to convict a briber, the government must prove that the ac-
cused intended to bribe the official. Intending to make a campaign
contribution does not constitute bribery, even though many con-
tributors hope that the official will act favorably because of their
contributions .... Accordingly, a jury instruction must adequately
distinguish between the lawful intent associated with making a cam-
paign contribution and the unlawful intent associated with
bribery. -44
The jury instruction to which Tomblin had objected required only
that the bribe have been offered corruptly.345 Tomblin contended
that a corrupt state of mind requirement was inconsistent with MVcCor-
mick's requirement of a quid pro quo. 3 " The court responded that,
because the instructions defined "corruptly" as "'intent to influence
an official act,' the instructions explain the reciprocity element of the
quid pro quo. [By offering money to Maudlin with intent to influence],
Tomblin had acted corruptly, that is, with unlawful purpose."' 47 This defini-
tion of the corrupt mental state is consistent with the definition of
corrupt intent at common law, that is, unlawful intent.
340 Id.
34] Id. at 1375.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 1379.
345 d. at 1380.
346 id.
347 Id. (emphasis added).
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The court naturally applied corrupt intent to Tomblin's bribery
charge because a corrupt state of mind requirement is included on
the face of the statute, but it did not apply "corruptly" to the extortion
charge. Instead, the court construed color-of-right extortion so that
an "unlawful purpose" was one of the crime's elements. Unlawful pur-
pose is synonymous with unlawful intent, which is the essence of cor-
rupt intent at common law. To prove that Tomblin had a wrongful
purpose, the court approvingly referenced the jury instruction's state-
ment that "wrongful ... is to cause the victim to give property to
someone who has no legitimate claim to the property. ' 348 The court's
"legitimate claim" standard asked the jury to evaluate the actor's
awareness of the legitimacy of his claim-that is, his knowledge of the
legality of his actions. The court's color-of-right extortion standard
was therefore not materially different from the requirement of cor-
rupt intent that it affirmed in the bribery conviction.
Tomblin demonstrates the inconsistency created by excluding cor-
rupt state of mind as an element of the Hobbs Act. The court had no
trouble affirming the bribery conviction, but, when it turned to the
extortion conviction, it experienced the underbreadth and differenti-
ation problems created by the lack of a corrupt state of mind require-
ment. The court's reasoning in affirming Tomblin's bribery
conviction was straightforward, but the court had to engage in verbal
gymnastics to justify upholding the extortion conviction for substan-
tially similar conduct. Further, the logical gymnastics in which the
court engaged were designed to imply an element of corrupt intent
into the Hobbs Act, so that Tomblin's obviously wrongful conduct
could be punished.
In United States v. Harding,3 49 the Sixth Circuit nominally con-
strued color-of-right extortion to comport with its common-law mean-
ing. Harding, the executive director of the Tennessee Real Estate
Commission, was convicted of extortion for offering to sell copies of
licensing exam answers.35 0 Harding raised objections to the scope of
the Hobbs Act. Affirming his conviction, the court reasoned that the
"'under color of official right' language reflects the common law defi-
nition of extortion, which could be committed only by a public offi-
cial's corrupt taking of a fee under color of his office and did not
require proof of threat, fear, or duress."'351 The court further noted,
"bribery and extortion as used in the Hobbs Act are not mutually ex-
348 Id. at 1385.
349 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977).
350 Id. at 301.
351 Id. at 306.
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clusive. ': 5 2 Both by connotative definition and analogy to bribery, the
court asserted that extortion under color of official right did and
should require a corrupt state of mind.353
Soon after Harding, the court decided United States v. Butler.3 5 4 In
Butler, the court held that bribery and extortion are not mutually ex-
clusive and could result from the same underlying conduct,3 5 5 imply-
ing that extortion under color of right also has to be committed
"corruptly." Also, as in Harding, the court subscribed to the common-
law definition of extortion that itself included corrupt state of mind as
an element.3 56 Lastly, the court held that "any wrongful use of a pub-
lic official's power for private personal gain is proscribed by the
Hobbs Act. '13 57 This holding followed the court's earlier statement:
that an official's use of power, to be extortionate, must be committed
with unlawful intent.
Although the Sixth Circuit used the word "corrupt" in its defini-
tion of extortion, and its reasoning was at least nominally tailored to
ferret out unlawful intent, the court did not indicate any conscious-
ness of the value of the corrupt state of mind element. Even if the
court did possess such an understanding, it is nevertheless now bound
to follow the holdings of McCormick and Evans, which limit the value
of corrupt intent as a differentiating and limiting element.
The Eighth Circuit occupies a unique position in color-of-right
extortion law. The Circuit recognized corrupt state of mind as an ele-
ment prior to Evans and McCormick, but the court maintained that the
taking had to be for a corrupt purpose rather than with a corrupt pur-
pose. In United States v. French, 3 5 1 the Eighth Circuit explicitly read a
corrupt intent element into color-of-right extortion. French has a fact
pattern strikingly similar to many of the cases at common law. French,
the city marshal of St. Louis, had an official duty to collect from the
surety a forfeited bail bond if the defendant failed to appear in
court.3 59 French was convicted on four occasions for allowing a surety
to pay amounts substantially less than the actual amount of the bond




354 618 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1980).
355 Id. at 417-18.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 419.
358 628 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1980).




The court reversed the district court's decision to set aside the
,jury conviction.361 Although the district court felt that no extortion
had been proven, the Circuit court maintained that "[t]here is no
doubt that 'under color of official right' includes this kind of corrupt
use of public office by the official to obtain such a wrongful personal
fee."362 The court further held that "[i t is the wrongful purpose of
the taking under color of official right that makes the appellee's con-
duct extortion under the Hobbs Act."3 63 The court's idea of wrongful
taking is supported by an explicit statement of corrupt intent: that is,
that "a public officer who corruptly seeks payment in return for short-
changing his duty to enforce the law has committed extortion. 364
The court asserted that "Hobbs Act coverage may ... extend to other
kinds of wrongful taking of money to which the extortioner may also
have a rightful claim."3 65 This contention created a critical distinction
between the Eighth Circuit's conception of extortion and the concep-
tion at common law: the Eighth Circuit penalized takings for a cor-
rupt purpose, while the common law punished takings with a corrupt
intent.
VI. JUDGE JOHN T. NOONAN'S BRIBES
No historical account of extortion or bribery can be complete
without reference to Judge John T. Noonan's book Bribes.'3 66 The
book, which stands as both a monumental work in its own right and as
the seminal composition in the history of corruption, fails to recog-
nize corrupt state of mind as an element of common-law extortion.
Noonan contends that bribery and extortion were separate crimes at
common law.36 7 His understanding of bribery at common law in-
cluded a corrupt state of mind,3 68 but he believed that "[e]xtortion
... required a showing of coercion .... -369 In Noonan's view, extor-
tion always required an element of coercion, therefore whatever state
of mind it may have required was already easily inferred from the co-
ercion. Further, extortion's coercive nature left little danger of a pub-
lic official committing it with innocent intent, as was possible with
bribetaking. Noonan's view of distinct extortion and bribery informs
361 Id. at 1070.
362 Id. at 1073.
363 Id. at 1074.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 1075.
366 NOONAN, supra note 9.
367 Id. at 398-99.
368 See id. at 334-424.
369 Id. at 398.
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his apparent distaste for the use of the Hobbs Act to punish bribetak-
ing behavior by public officials. '71
This Note substantially disagrees with Noonan in only one re-
spect: it asserts that, at common (and modern) law, there was (and is)
little distinction between color-of-right extortion and bribery. At least
in this respect, the position adopted by this Note has been supported
by scholarly authority371 and, more importantly, by the Supreme
Court in United States v. McCormick '72 and United States v. Evans. 3 73 As
Professor James Lindgren noted, "Noonan [did not write] a history of
extortion and neither cites any extortion cases to support [his] views
that extortion was limited to coercion at English common law."3 74
Common-law extortion in England was in one sense similar to
current American jurisprudence. The criminal act alone-receipt of
inappropriate value by a public official-spanned a potentially limit-
less range of conduct. Furthermore, this law coexisted with a system
in which public officials acted within a complex array of customary
fees, statutory fee tables, and duty. The historical context of the pub-
lic officials at whom the Crown and the courts directed laws against
corruption contains striking parallels to modern politics, particularly
to the campaign finance system. One primary difference, however,
between corrupt behavior as seen by the common law and modern
corruption law is that common-law extortion operated in the context
of a well-defined intent element-"corruptly"-whereas modern fed-
eral extortion law has no coherent principle with which to differenti-
ate the guilty from the innocent, or to limit the potentially limitless
language of the Hobbs Act.
CONCILUSION
Corruption is a practice both complex and historically en-
demic.3 7 5 Potentially corrupt behavior often straddles already murky
lines of propriety. To regulate corruption properly, the law requires a
370 See id. at 585-87.
371 See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 15, at 824.
372 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
373 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
374 James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribely-Extortion Distinc-
tion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1729 (1993).
375 Noonan notes "[t]hat bribery is wrong, that a bribe must distort judgment-
assumptions which may seem too obvious to need justification-are not self-evident."
NOONAN, supra note 9, at 3. According to Noonan, bribery and extortion were com-
mon in cultures ranging from ancient Egypt, Babylon, and Mespotamia, to classic
Rome, Byzantium, England, and the United States of America. hi. at 3-9, 31,104-05,
114-16, 233, 427. In modern day Russia, business owners pay public officials an esti-
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mated $33 billion in bribes yearly "to keep things running smoothly . Sabrina
Tavernise, A Russian Tilts at Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at A3.
Examining corruption in the ancient Roman state (circa 74 B.C.) is particularly
instructive: "in Rome, legitimate power was in the hands of a governing elite, which
stood out by its opulence." 1 HISTORY OF PRIvATE LIFE, supra note 13, at 95. While
mere access to power, without more, often breeds some corruption, the Roman sys-
tem compounded the problem by making such access exclusive: "The Senate was a
club, and the club members decided whether or not a man had the social profile
necessary for membership .... Public offices were treated as though they were private
dignities, access to which depended on private contracts." I id. at 95-96. Unsurpris-
ingly, conduct that modern society would characterize as corrupt was rife: "In Rome
every superior stole from his subordinates.... Every public function was a racket .. "
I id. at 97. Although we would classify the Roman system as hopelessly corrupt, it is
more helpful to characterize it as based upon substantially different concepts of right
and reciprocity. See NOONAN, supra note 9, at 3-5. Reciprocity in the form of bribery
was so entrenched in the Roman system that "an official schedule of bribes eventually
was established and posted in every office." I HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, supra note 13,
at 99. Failure to act on a bribe by a public official could even give rise to ajudicially
enforceable right to redress on the part of the bribegiver:
Even the least important public positions, (militia), such as apparitor or
clerk of the courts, were sold by their incumbents to aspiring candidates,
because every position carried with it a guaranteed income in the form of
bribes. A new officeholder was supposed to pay a substantial gratuity (spor-
tula) to his superior. In the Late Empire, even the highest dignitaries, ap-
pointed by the Emperor, paid such a gratuity to the imperial treasury. From
the very beginning of the Empire, every dignity bestowed by the emperor,
from consul to mere captain, imposed upon the person honored the moral
duty to make a bequest to his benefactor, the emperor. Failure to fulfill this
duty meant running the risk of having one's will set aside for ingratitude and
one's estate confiscated by the imperial treasury. And, since every nomina-
tion was Inade on the recommendation of "patrons" with court connections,
these recommendations (suffragia) were sold, or, in any case, paid for. If the
patron did not keep his word, the victim did not hesitate to complain to the
courts.
1 id. at 98-99.
Although bribery was not, strictly speaking, immoral, excessive corruption could
incur liability. In perhaps the most famous case of Roman corruption, Cicero prose-
cuted the infamous Gaius Verres for "committing many acts of lechery and brutality
against the citizens and allies of Rome, and many crimes against God and man....
[Verres] has illegally taken from Siciliy sums amounting to forty million seterces."
CICERO, Against Verres, in CICERO: SELECTED WORKS 35, 57 (Penguin Classics ed.,
Michael Grant trans., 1971). Verres's crime was not that he had accepted bribes and
extorted from the province he was given to govern, rather it was that he had extorted
so much and so brutally. d. passim. Tellingly, a substantial portion of Cicero's open-
ing narration in the trial focuses not on Verres, but on integrity of the judges in the
extortion court where Verres was being tried (the existence of a special court for
extortions is itself suggestive). Id. at 44-55. Cicero's concern is not his ability to
prove Verres's guilt, but rather with Verres's ability to bribe the entire court. Id. Pre-
sumably, such behavior was fairly common. L.H.G. Greenwood, Introduction to I Cic-
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tool that is flexible enough to solve problems of breadth and precise
enough to overcome difficulties of differentiation. Fortunately, courts
can meet this functional need by doing nothing more than remaining
faithful to the formal principle of Morrisette, and rediscovering the
common law's corrupt state of mind.
"Corruptly" can have one of two alternate roles in the context of
bribery, extortion, and illegal gratuities. It can have a central role as a
guarantor against the prosecution of ethically protected campaign ac-
tivity and extortion victims, against bribery and extortion statutes with
boundless scope, and against serious problems of over- and under-
breadth. This is the role properly assigned to it both formally and
functionally, the role consistent with history and common sense. The
alternative, sadly adopted by some courts, assigns corrupt state of
mind a marginal role whose sole purpose is to distinguish between a
bribe and an illegal gratuity whilst color-of-right extortion is left a
strict liability crime.
ERO: THE VERRINE ORATIONS, at ix-xvi (L.H.G. Greenwood trans., 1989).
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